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This thesis studies herding in the Finnish stock market between 1.7.2005 and 30.6.2009. Key
questions are (1) was there herding in the Finnish market during that time, (2) is there a link
between herding and returns and (3) is there a link between herding and volatility. Herding was
measured using the herding measure developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992). The
relationship between herding and returns and herding and volatility was studied using a mixed-
effects regression model. The data used was provided by Euroclear Finland Oy.
During the study period considerable amount of herding was found. The average amount of
herding during the whole study period was 10.10 %. In the pre-crisis period the average amount
was 9.79 %; in the crisis period 10.40 %. In the pre-crisis period the buy herding measure and sell
herding measure had almost identical values. During the crisis period a clear gap emerged, when
the buy herding measure decreased to 7.23 % while the sell herding measure increased to 12.11
%. This implies that during a crisis sell-side herding is more common than buy-side herding.
It seems that household investors and institutional investors both herd less than the average
investor in the Finnish market. When looking at the whole study period of 2005 - 2009, institutional
investors herded on average less than household investors. However, in the crisis period of 2007
- 2009 institutions herded slightly more than household investors.
During the whole study period, on average, large capitalization stocks experienced more herd-
ing than small capitalization stocks. The lowest levels of herding were observed in health care
and consumer staples industries. Highest levels of herding were observed in telecommunication
services, materials and utilities.
A statistically significant link between past returns and herding was found. High past returns
correlate with higher sell-side herding, while poor past returns correlate with higher buy-side herd-
ing. This implies that investors in the Finnish market followed a contrarian investment strategy,
selling past winners and buying past losers.
Regarding herding and future returns some statistically significant correlations were found, but
on the whole the results were inconclusive. When studying the link between herding and both past
and future volatility, no conclusive results were obtained.
Keywords: herding, LSV, investor behaviour, behavioral finance, stock market
The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service.
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Jon Leskinen: Sijoittajien laumautuminen Suomen osakemarkkinoilla
Diplomityö
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Helmikuu 2020
Tässä diplomityössä tutkittiin laumautumista Suomen osakemarkkinoilla aikavälillä 1.7.2005
- 30.6.2009. Keskeisiä kysymyksiä ovat (1) tapahtuiko Suomen markkinoilla laumautumista mai-
nittuna aikana, (2) onko laumautumisen ja tuottojen välillä yhteys ja (3) onko laumautumisen ja
volatiliteetin välillä yhteys. Laumautumista mitattiin mittarilla, jonka ovat kehittäneet Lakonishkok,
Shleifer ja Vishny (1992) . Laumautumisen ja tuottojen sekä laumautumisen ja volatiliteetin väli-
sen yhteyden tutkimiseen käytettiin lineaarista regressioanalyysiä. Käytetty data saatiin Euroclear
Finland Oy:ltä.
Tutkitulla aikavälillä havaittiin merkittävää laumautumista. Koko tutkimusajalta laumautumisen
keskiarvo oli 10.10 %. Ennen kriisiä olevalla periodilla (2005 - 2007) keskimääräinen laumautu-
minen oli 9.79 %; kriisiperiodilla (2007 - 2009) 10.40 %. Ennen kriisiä olevalla periodilla osto- ja
myyntilaumautumisen arvot olivat lähes identtiset. Kriisiperiodin aikana ne eriytyivät, kun ostolau-
mautuminen laski 7.23 %:iin ja myyntilaumautuminen nousi 12.11 %:iin. Vaikuttaa siis siltä, että
kriisin aikana myyntilaumautuminen on yleisempää kuin ostolaumautuminen.
Tulosten perusteella sekä yksityiset sijoittajat että institutionaaliset sijoittajat laumautuvat vä-
hemmän kuin keskimääräinen Suomen markkinoilla oleva sijoittaja. Kun tarkastellaan koko 2005
- 2009 tutkimusperiodia, institutionaaliset sijoittajat laumautuivat vähemmän kuin yksityiset sijoit-
tajat. Kuitenkin, kriisiperiodin aikana instituutiot laumautuivat hieman enemmän kuin yksityiset
sijoittajat.
Koko tutkimusperiodilla suuren kapitalisaation osakkeet kokivat enemmän laumautumista kuin
pienen kapitalisaation osakkeet. Toimialoista terveydenhuolto ja kuluttajahyödykkeet kokivat vähi-
ten laumautumista. Eniten laumautumista havaittiin telekommunikaatiopalveluissa, materiaaleissa
ja yleishyödyllisissä palveluissa.
Tilastollisesti merkitsevä linkki menneiden tuottojen ja laumautumisen välillä löydettiin. Kor-
keat menneet tuotot korreloivat korkeamman myyntilaumautumisen kanssa, kun matalat menneet
tuotot korreloivat ostolaumautumisen kanssa. Tämä implikoi, että sijoittajat Suomen markkinalla
sijoittavat vastavirtaan, myyden menneitä voittajia ja ostaen menneitä häviäjiä.
Laumautumisen ja tulevien tuottojen väliltä löydettiin joitain tilastollisesti merkitseviä yhteyksiä,
mutta kokonaisuudessaan tulokset eivät ole vakuuttavia. Myöskään laumautumisen ja tulevan tai
menneen volatiliteetin väliltä ei löydetty yksiselitteistä korrelaatiota.
Avainsanat: laumautuminen, LSV, sijoittajien käyttäytyminen, behavioraalinen rahoitus, osake-
markkinat
Tämän julkaisun alkuperäisyys on tarkastettu Turnitin OriginalityCheck -ohjelmalla.
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11 INTRODUCTION
Herding is a well-known phenomenon where investors disregard their own information
and instead imitate the observed decisions of others (Hwang and Salmon 2004). The
purpose of this thesis is to empirically study herding in the Finnish stock market between
2005 and 2009. Special focus is put on the effect of the global financial crisis of 2007 -
2008 and the difference between institutional investors and household investors. On one
hand, herding can be seen as irrational, since in classical economic theory all investment
decisions should reflect the agents’ rationally formed expectations, which are formed
by using all available information in an efficient manner (Scharfstein, Stein et al. 1990).
On the other hand, herding behavior may sometimes be rational to individual agents.
These situations might include professional investors who worry about their reputation
(Scharfstein, Stein et al. 1990) or situations where there is little fundamental information
available, but many opportunities to observe the investment decisions of others (so-called
information cascades) (Alevy, Haigh and List 2007; Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh 2003).
Herding has been observed to happen in a variety of markets, including real-estate
(Philippas et al. 2013), bonds (Oehler and Chao 2000; Raddatz and Schmukler 2011)
and stocks (e.g. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Nofsinger and Sias 1999; Wer-
mers 1999). Herding is commonly thought to destabilize markets and increase volatility
(Alevy, Haigh and List 2007; Philippas et al. 2013; Scharfstein, Stein et al. 1990), but
some authors argue that herding can in fact speed up the price process and drive prices
towards equilibrium values (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman 1994).
Multiple reasons for herding have been suggested in earlier literature. These include rep-
utational risks for managers (Scharfstein, Stein et al. 1990), correlated private informa-
tion (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1992; Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman 1994),
information cascades (Hirshleifer and Welch 1992) and preference for stocks with cer-
tain characteristics (Falkenstein 1996). These reasons are investigated more in-depth in
chapter 2.
The topic of this thesis is relevant for multiple reasons. First, only a few studies (Grinblatt
and Keloharju 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Kyrolainen and Perttunen 2003) have
focused on the Finnish stock market. Secondly, the effect of the global financial crisis
on herding gives an interesting perspective and it has never before been studied in the
Finnish market. Third, this thesis also studies the relationship between herding and both
past and future returns. This may give new insights about the reasons behind herding and
the circumstances under which herding might occur. Fourth, the behaviour of household
2investors is rarely studied, perhaps due to data limitations.
This Master’s thesis uses a rare data set from Euroclear Finland Oy (previously Finnish
Central Security Depository) to empirically study herding. This data set includes in-
vestors’ trades on daily and even intra-day levels. The data spans 21 years, from 1995
to 2016. This thesis focuses on the time period between 2005 and 2009. The data is
presented more thoroughly in chapter 3. This thesis has three main themes: the amount
of herding in the Finnish stock market between 2005 and 2009, the relationship between
herding and returns and the relationship between herding and stock price volatility. There
are 5 main questions and some sub-questions:
1. Was there herding in the Finnish stock market between 2005 and 2009, and if so,
how much?
 Does herding differ between the pre-crisis (2005 - 2007) and crisis (2007 -
2009) periods?
 Is there a difference between buy-side and sell-side herding prevalence?
 Is there a difference between the herding of institutional investors and house-
hold investors?
 Does herding differ between industries?
2. Do past stock returns affect herding?
3. Does herding affect future stock returns?
4. Does past volatility affect herding?
5. Does herding affect future volatility?
These questions are addressed in chapters 4 and 5. Previous work in this field include
e.g. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999), Ge˛bka and Wohar (2013), Goodfellow, Bohl and Gebka
(2009), Hsieh (2013), Kim and S.-J. Wei (2002), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992),
Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999) and Zheng, Li and Chiang (2017).
Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) studied herding in the Korean market using the LSV herding
measure and found herding amounts in excess of 20 % for some large Korean stocks.
Ge˛bka and Wohar (2013) studied herding in different industries and found that on an in-
ternational level, basic materials, consumer services and oil and gas stocks show some
evidence of herding. Unfortunately comparing the results of this thesis with those of
Ge˛bka and Wohar (2013) is difficult, since they utilize a different industry classification.
Using data from Poland, Goodfellow, Bohl and Gebka (2009) measure herding using the
CSAD measure developed by Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000). They find that indi-
vidual investors herd more during bear markets and less during bull markets. This is
consistent with the findings of this thesis. Goodfellow, Bohl and Gebka (2009) find no
evidence of institutional investor herding. In this thesis some evidence of insitutional in-
vestor herding is found. Hsieh (2013) found significant evidence of herding in Taiwan.
Using the LSV measure, the average herding amount of institutional investors was 16.92
3% while the herding amount of individual investors was 6.73 %. He also found that indi-
vidual investors are contrarian investors, who buy stocks with negative past returns and
sell stocks with positive past returns. These results are well in line with the findings of
this thesis.
Studying investors in Korea using the LSV herding measure, Kim and S.-J. Wei (2002)
found herding levels between 8.4 % and 13.2 % for individual foreign investors, but lower
levels of herding between 4.8 % and 8.3 % for resident individual investors. Similar
levels of herding are found in this study. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) originally
developed the herding measure later used by many others, including this thesis. They
measured the herding of mutual fund money managers and found low herding amounts
of 2.7 %. In this thesis the level of institutional investor herding is somewhat larger, but
considering the differences in data, market size and time period, still well in line with the
original findings of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Nofsinger and Sias (1999)
study the herding of institutional and individual investors. They also investigate post-
herding returns. They find that the stocks institutional investors flock to buy perform better
than those they sell. They do not use the LSV herding measure and their herding period
is one year. In this thesis no conclusive results about the relationship between herding
and future returns were found.
Wermers (1999) studied mutual fund herding between 1975 and 1994. Using the LSV
measure he found only low levels of herding, 3.4 %. He also found that mutual funds seem
to use momentum investment strategies. His findings imply that momentum investment
strategies are rational, since no evidence of subsequent return reversals were found.
The levels of herding observed in this thesis are consistent with the findings of Wermers
(1999). In this thesis it is found that investors in the Finnish market show contrarian
tendencies and no evidence of momentum investment strategies are found. Zheng, Li
and Chiang (2017) study herding in 9 Asian markets using the CSAD measure. They find
that cross-industry herding occurs most commonly in the telecommunication and financial
industries, and that herding is more pronounced in down markets. These results are well
in line with the findings of this thesis.
This thesis also adds to the body of literature investigating whether herding destabilizes
or stabilizes markets. If buy-side herding destabilizes markets, then there should be and
observable price increase followed by a price decrease. If, on the other hand, herding
stabilizes markets and drives prices towards their equilibrium values, then there should
be no observable price decrease after the initial price increase (Wermers 1999). This
thesis studies the stabilizing or destabilizing nature of herding through the relationship
between herding and volatility.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes herding as a
phenomenon, some possible reasons behind it and different methods used to measure
herding. Chapter 3 introduces the data and methodology. Chapter 4 presents the re-
sults regarding herding in the Finnish stock market. Chapter 5 analyzes the relationship
between herding, returns and volatility. Chapter 6 concludes.
42 HERDING THEORY
This chapter introduces herding as a phenomenon, takes a look at some possible reasons
behind herding and presents different measures used to study herding.
2.1 Basic theory of herding
Herding is a well-known and widely researched phenomenon in financial markets. The
term herding comes from the perceived habit of investors to "follow the herd" in their
investment decisions. Different researches have defined herding in a multitude of ways.
Hwang and Salmon (2004) say that "herding arises when investors decide to imitate the
observed decisions of others or movements in the market rather than follow their own
beliefs and information". Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) say that "herding results from
an obvious intent by investors to copy the behaviour of other investors". Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) define herding by money managers as "buying (selling) the
same stocks as other managers buy (sell) at the same time".
Even in these definitions we can observe an important difference: does herding happen
only when investors knowingly decide to follow others, or can trades in the same stocks at
the same time be defined as herding? Relating to this Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000)
have defined "spurious herding". Spurious herding occurs when investors face similar
decision problems and have the same information, so they make similar investment deci-
sions. Here investors do not follow each others’ trades, but still buy (or sell) at the same
time. When empirically researching herding, the problem is that it is challenging, maybe
even impossible, to separate spurious herding from "real" herding just by looking at the
data. Changes in fundamentals may drive many investors to buy (or sell) the same stocks
at the same time independent of each other. Then, in reality, no herding has occurred,
since investors make their decisions independent of each others’ investment decisions.
But separating this from a situation where investors base their investment decisions on
the previously observed decisions of other investors is close to impossible, since both
situations look identical in most commonly used data types (e.g. transaction data or
changes in portfolio composition).
Research on herding usually focuses either on herding by institutional investors or by in-
dividual investors (Merli and Roger 2013). Institutional investors include banks, mutual
funds, pension funds and other institutions where professional managers are responsi-
5ble for making the investment decisions. Individual investors are retail investors, non-
professionals, who invest through brokerage firms or savings accounts. This division be-
tween institutional and individual investors is justifiable, since professional investors and
non-professional investors may differ in their goals, incentives and information available
to them (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1992). There are also important differences
in the availability of data concerning the groups: many institutions have to report their
holdings on regular basis (e.g. quarterly 13F filings in the US), while there is usually little
data available on the trades made by individual investors.
Many possible reasons for institutional herding have been identified. These include in-
formation cascades, investigative herding, reputational herding, fads and characteristic
herding (Sias 2004). These will be looked at more closely in the next section. Some of
these reasons are also applicable in the case of individual investors (such as informa-
tional cascades), while e.g. reputation is not usually a concern for individual investors.
Herding is an important phenomenon to investigate since it has been linked to a number
on financial phenomena, including excess volatility, momentum, reversals in stock prices
and investment recommendations (Graham 1999; Nofsinger and Sias 1999). It has been
said that herding hinders the price discovery process, since investors who herd do not
reveal their own private information but instead choose to ignore it (Philippas et al. 2013).
It has also been theorized that herding by institutional investors may destabilize markets
and drive asset prices away from their fundamental values (Alevy, Haigh and List 2007;
Philippas et al. 2013; Scharfstein, Stein et al. 1990). There is also a contrary view that
argues that herding by institutional investors might in fact speed up the price discovery
process and drive asset prices towards their fundamental values faster (Hirshleifer, Sub-
rahmanyam and Titman 1994).
The reasoning behind these ideas is as follows: if institutional investors follow each oth-
ers’ example in trades without any regard to fundamentals, asset prices can increase (or
decrease) past their fundamental values. If markets are efficient, after this initial price
increase there should be a price decrease as other investors now realize that the asset
is overpriced and sell it. If this holds, then after buy-side herding has occurred, there
should be an increase in asset prices which is followed by a subsequent decrease in
prices. Thus herding would cause increased volatility, drive asset prices away from their
fundamental values and create reversals in said asset prices.
On the other hand, institutional investors may actually drive prices toward their funda-
mental values and stabilize markets. If markets are efficient, but new information is not
reflected in asset prices instantly but is instead incorporated over time, and if institutional
investors are better informed than other investors, then herding by institutional investors
may speed up the price discovery process and drive asset prices towards their funda-
mental values. If this is the case, then the price increase following a buy herd should not
be followed by a subsequent price decrease.
This brings us back to the concept of "spurious herding". In the latter example institutional
6investors might all get the same signal about a change in fundamentals at the same time
and because of that signal make the same investment decision. Because the trades
happen at the same time and in the same direction, many researches would classify this
as herding. This trading would also move prices towards the fundamental value (since
the signal that started the trading was new information about fundamentals). Thus one
might come to the conclusion that institutional herding stabilizes markets, while in fact
there was no "real" herding, only a rational reaction to new information. The measuring
of herding and the shortcomings of different measures are discussed in a later section.
2.2 Reasons for herding
As previously mentioned, many possible reasons for herding have been identified in lit-
erature. Some of the reasons apply to both institutional and individual investors, some
to just one group. A common assumption in herding literature is that individual investors
are poorly informed noise traders. It has been suggested that individual investors are
influenced by investment fads or styles, that they irrationally extrapolate past growth rates
into the future, that they buy attention grabbing stocks because of limited attention spans
or that they sell past winners and hold on to past losers (also called the disposition effect)
(Barber, Odean and Zhu 2009; Nofsinger and Sias 1999). Different possible reasons for
herding are discussed more in-depth in this section.
Information cascades can occur when decisions are made sequentially and earlier de-
cisions are publicly observable. An information cascade arises when individuals choose
to ignore their private information and instead choose to repeat the actions of previous
decision makers (Alevy, Haigh and List 2007; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992).
This may create a situation where investors herd on an investment decision that is wrong
for all of them.
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) give an example: let us suppose that the are 100
investors who each have their own assessments, possibly different, about the profitability
of an investing opportunity. 20 of these investors believe that the investment is profitable
while 80 investors believe it is not. Every investor knows only their own estimate of the
profitability; they do not know the assessments of others’ or known which opinion is more
common. If all the investors got together and pooled their knowledge, they would decide
that this investment opportunity does not seem profitable. In addition, these investors do
not make their investment decision at the same time. Investing at the same time would
create a situation where 20 optimistic individual invest and 80 more pessimistic ones do
not invest. Instead, the decisions are made sequentially and investors can observe the
decisions made by people before them. Now, if the first few investors are among the 20
optimistic ones and they decide to invest, they can influence some of the 80 pessimistic
investors to invest too, which in turn leads to a snowballing effect where almost everyone
invests. This kind of behaviour can be rational, since if an investor’s information about
the profitability of the investment opportunity is not certain, or there is little information
7available, following the decisions of others’ can be rational because they might know more
and their investment decision should reflect their knowledge (Alevy, Haigh and List 2007).
So, if all the people before you have invested, you could assume they know something
that you don’t and that you should invest too.
This example illustrates three aspects of information cascades. (1) The decisions made
by the early investors may determine what the majority decides. (2) The decision that
the investors herd on may be wrong. (3) If the majority decision is wrong, then upon the
arrival of new information or with experience the herd may reverse their decision and start
a herd in the opposite direction. This kind of behaviour increases volatility in the market.
(Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000)
Investigative herding means that investors focus on examining a piece of information
they believe that others will also examine (Graham 1999). The investor would like to sell
their investment at a profit, but this is possible only if other investors study the same signal
and thus drive the price to the direction anticipated by the first investor. Froot, Scharfstein
and Stein (1992) have developed a model describing this kind of behaviour. They give
an example: let us assume that there are two variables, a and b, which have useful
information about the value of an investment. Individual investors can learn information
about a or b but not both. For all the information to be correctly included in the asset
price, half the traders should study a and the other half b. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein
(1992) argue that if traders have long investment horizons, this is what happens. On the
other hand, if traders have short horizons the situation is different. If all traders choose
to study a, there is no incentive for an individual trader to study b. Even though b should
affect the asset price (and with a long horizon it eventually would), with a short horizon, if
nobody else is studying b, information obtainable from studying b will not affect the asset
price. Thus all short-term traders operate only on information obtainable from studying a.
This sort of informational inefficiency caused by short-term trading mean that all traders
may focus on one source of information. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) argue further
that "the informational spillovers can be so powerful that groups of traders may choose
to focus on very poor quality data, or even on completely extraneous variables that bear
no relation at all to fundamentals". This is a Keynesian beauty contest where traders do
not try to define the fundamental value of an asset. Instead they try to guess what other
traders think the price for the asset should be.
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1994) make another complementary point re-
garding investigative herding. In their model investors receive information relating to an
asset at different times. Competent (or lucky) investors receive this information before
others. This gives them the ability to buy (or sell) the asset before the information spreads
further and is fully reflected in the asset price. The earlier they receive the relevant infor-
mation, the more profit there is to be made, since the new information is not yet reflected
in the asset price. Now, if many investors study the same asset, then the new information
will spread quickly and the profits can be realized faster and with more certainty. On the
other hand, if no other investors follow the same asset, then the new information would
8never be reflected in the asset price and there would be no profits available. Hirshleifer,
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1994) argue that this leads to investors focusing on certain
assets on the expense of others.
Reputational herding occurs when an investors decides to ignore their private infor-
mation and instead copy the actions of previous investors, similar to what happens in
information cascades. However, reputational herding models have an added layer of
mimicking other investors (Graham 1999). These reputational herding models, such as
the one developed by Scharfstein, Stein et al. (1990), take into account reputational ben-
efits obtainable through herding. Because of this, reputational herding applies primarily to
analysts or professional managers whose compensation or career development is linked
to their perceived ability.
In the model developed by Scharfstein, Stein et al. (1990), and also used by Graham
(1999), professional analysts can be either smart of dumb. Smart analysts receive in-
formative signals about the value of an investment, while dumb analysts receive purely
random signals. No analyst knows whether they are smart or dumb. All analysts can
observe the investment decision made by others before them. This means that smart
managers receive correlated signals, while dumb managers receive purely random sig-
nals. This means that if an analyst copies the behaviour of other managers, he implies
to others (peers, employers) that he, too, has received a signal that is correlated with the
signals of others, meaning he is more likely to be smart. In contrast, if an analyst takes
a contrarian position, they are more likely to be dumb (all other things being equal). This
creates a "sharing-the-blame" effect. If the analyst is a part of the majority that invests,
and the investment is profitable, the analyst is perceived to be smart and they are re-
warded. On the other hand, if the investment turns out to be unprofitable, the analyst
can "share the blame" and claim that all the analysts who invested are smart, but this
outcome was simply unpredictable. This way the analyst does not seem to be dumber
than the others. (Scharfstein, Stein et al. 1990)
Style investing (also known as investment trends or fads) means that some investors
group risky assets into different styles (categories) and move their funds between these
styles (Barberis and Shleifer 2003). Assets in a single category usually share some
common characteristics. These categories might be e.g. government bonds, small-cap
stocks or real-estate. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) state that interest in style investing
has risen over the years and many funds now follow a certain investment style, such as
investing in growth stocks, value stocks or technology stocks.
An investment style is usually born when good fundamental news regarding securities
within this style are released. This could mean e.g. that many technology companies
release financial statements reporting much better profits and growth than anticipated.
This would trigger the relocation of funds from other styles towards technology stocks.
The problem is, funds will move to all stocks that are grouped as "technology", even
though the fundamentals may differ completely. Style investing creates common factors
in the returns of assets that have been grouped in the same style, even though there
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fundamentally different assets may converge just because they have been classified into
the same style, while the returns of fundamentally similar assets may disperse just be-
cause they have been grouped into different styles. (Barberis and Shleifer 2003) This is
problematic, since high past returns will direct funds towards a certain style, which will
further raise the prices of assets belonging into that style, driving even more funds to the
same style. According to Barberis and Shleifer (2003) the style will finally collapse, either
because of arbitrage or because of bad new about fundamentals.
One possible explanation for individuals’ tendency to focus on certain styles may be indi-
vidual investors limited attention span. Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009) find that individual
investors’ purchases are concentrated on "attention-grabbing" stocks, i.e. stocks with
abnormally high trading volumes in recent history. When deciding which stocks to buy,
individual investors face a search problem: there are thousand of stocks to choose from.
To simplify this search, individual investors may concentrate on stocks that have recently
grabbed their attention. If a certain investment style is popular (e.g. technology stocks),
these stocks will receive abnormally high trading volumes and may catch the eye of indi-
vidual investors. This may increase the buys done by individual investors towards stocks
that represent the aforementioned style.
Characteristic herding means that investors have a preference or aversion towards se-
curities with certain kind of characteristics. Falkenstein (1996) studied the preferences of
US open-end mutual funds. The most important findings are as follows: the funds prefer
stocks with high volatility and high liquidity, but show an aversion towards low-price stocks
and small firms. Funds also avoid companies with little information available about them.
Gompers and Metrick (2001) have also studied the preferences of institutional investors.
They found that large institutions prefer stocks with larger market capitalizations, more
liquidity, higher book-to-market ratios and lower returns for the previous year. They also
found that large institutions have almost doubled their share of the market between 1980
and 1996. A related model is the search cost model developed by Vayanos and Wang
(2007). Here investors flock towards stocks with low search costs, meaning that investors
trade stocks where buyers and sellers are quickly matched with each other. This drives
investors to focus on more liquid stocks.
This kind of behaviour from institutional investors cannot always be classified as herding.
If institutions have observed the investment decisions of other institutions and decided
to follow their trades, that behaviour is herding and it would lead to institutions buying
stocks with similar characteristics. It is also possible that institutions have decided to
buy stocks with similar characteristics independent of each other. For example, buying
small and illiquid stocks is difficult for institutional investors because making bids on large
amounts of illiquid stocks would increase the stock price and result in the investor paying
a price higher than the current market price. Thus large institutional investors may not be
able to trade smaller stocks without affecting the stock price and incurring extra costs for
themselves.
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Gompers and Metrick (2001) also found that the institutional investors’ preference for
large and liquid stocks, combined with the rising total market share of institutions, has
increased the demand for such stocks and thus resulted in price increases and high
returns for large stocks relative to small stocks between 1980 and 1996.
Using a momentum investment strategy an investors buys and sells stocks based on
their past returns, meaning that investors buy past winners and sell past losers (Bikhchan-
dani and Sharma 2000). If markets are thought to be efficient, this kind of behaviour is not
rational, since all available information is thought to be included in the prices. Thus, after
a price increase, no further price increase is to be expected (until new positive information
is published). According to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) this kind of behaviour can
exaggerate price movements and increase volatility. On the other hand, if incorporating
new information into prices takes some time, this kind of behaviour can be rational.
A lot of empirical research has been done about momentum investment strategies. For
example, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) found that mutual funds show a tendency
to buy past winners. However, the tendency to sell past losers was less pronounced. They
also found that funds who buy past winners realize higher returns. Froot, O’connell and
Seasholes (2001) found that international portfolio flows are strongly influenced by past
returns, which is consistent with international institutional investors using momentum in-
vestment strategies. They also found that these inflows of money have forecasting power
for future returns, meaning that momentum investment strategies may create higher fu-
ture returns.
Using a data set spanning from 1975 to 1994 Wermers (1999) found that mutual funds
show evidence of momentum investing strategies. The findings also indicate that using
momentum investment strategies is rational, since he found no evidence of subsequent
return reversals. Similar to Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), he found that buy-
ing past winners is more common than selling past losers. Their findings support the
view that momentum investment strategies may be rational and drive prices towards their
fundamental values.
Using a more recent data set from 1994 to 2003, Brown, K. D. Wei and Wermers (2013)
get an opposite result. They found that buy herding by institutional investors increases
prices during the herding quarter, but the prices decrease during the following year. Simi-
larly, stocks sold by institutional investors show a price decrease during the herding quar-
ter but show a reversal in returns during the following year. They also found that funds
are more likely to herd on the sell-side than on the buy-side, contrary to earlier findings.
These findings suggest that momentum investment strategies may not be rational, since
price increases following excess buying are followed by return reversals. Brown, K. D.
Wei and Wermers (2013) do not dispute earlier, contrasting results, but instead suggest
that mutual fund trading may have become destabilizing in more recent times.
Individual investors may also participate in momentum trading. Barber, Odean and Zhu
(2009) present possible psychological reasons for this: the representativeness heuristic
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and the limited attention of individual investors. The representativeness heuristic means
that investors expect a small sample and a short time-series of data to represent the
underlying distribution. This will lead to investors over-weighting recent returns in fore-
casting future returns, directing investors towards buying recent winners. The limited
attention span of investors means that when choosing which stocks to buy, investors will
focus on attention grabbing stocks that have abnormally high recent trading volumes.
As mentioned in the chapter describing style investing, focusing on attention grabbing
stocks with high trading volumes (and high recent returns) will cause investors to buy
these stocks. While the reason for purchasing such stocks isn’t necessarily high past re-
turns themselves, this psychological factor may direct individual investors towards buying
such stocks nevertheless.
2.3 Measuring herding
Measuring herding is a difficult task. Herding as a phenomenon is well established and
many possible reasons for herding have been presented. But when trying to empirically
measure herding one faces multiple problems. One problem is that is it difficult, maybe
even impossible, to tell apart "spurious" herding from "real" herding just by looking at the
data (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000). Even if an abnormally large amount of investors
is trading on the same side of the market, this may not be evidence of herding. This
trading might be caused by a change in fundamentals, to which all investors are reacting
simultaneously and independently. On the other hand, these changes in fundamentals
might justify a smaller change in the price of asset than actually happened. In this case,
excess buying/selling because of herding may be partially to blame. To separate which
part of trading is based on fundamentals and which part is because of herding is, in
practice, impossible.
Another problem with measuring herding is related to deducing the reason behind herd-
ing. Even though many possible reasons for herding have been identified, telling these
apart by looking at the data is challenging to say the least. Even if herding itself is suc-
cessfully found and measured, the reason behind this herding can’t reliably be deduced
from the data types most commonly in use. For example, how would one tell apart herd-
ing caused by information cascades and herding caused by reputational concerns if the
end results looks identical in the data?
One reason for these difficulties in measuring herding is the data available. Many articles
(e.g. Brown, K. D. Wei and Wermers 2013; Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers 1995; Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Wermers 1999) use quarterly reported data of mutual
fund holdings. While this data does tell about the net purchases/sales done between
quarters, it tells nothing about the reasoning behind the investment decisions. Indeed,
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) state that "One cannot distinguish between different
causes of herd behavior directly from the analysis of a data set on asset holdings and
price changes since it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern the motive behind a trade
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that is not driven by “fundamentals”". However, they suggest it may be possible to try and
filter out reactions to public information by allowing for changes in fundamentals. If after
this filtering herding is still found, then the reason might e.g. information cascades, rep-
utational herding or some other identified reason for herding. But which kind of herding?
Because no data on the subjective reasoning of each individual investor (professional or
non-professional) is available, differentiating between different kinds of herding is difficult
(Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000).
As previously stated, many articles have used data about mutual fund holdings or about
the holdings of other institutional investors. The herding of individual investors has been
investigated less, at least partly because data on the trades and holdings of individual
investors is not widely available. Some exceptions to this are Barber, Odean and Zhu
(2009), Dorn, Huberman and Sengmueller (2008) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000).
Because data on the actual reasons behind investors’ investment decisions is not avail-
able, practically all empirical research focuses on finding abnormal clustering of trades
with purely statistical methods. Thus there is no clear link between the theoretical discus-
sion about the reasons behind herding and the empirical measurement of herding. Gra-
ham (1999) and Wermers (1999) can be mentioned as exceptions, since they link their
empirical findings to momentum investment strategies and reputational herding models.
Many studies do not try to differentiate "spurious" herding from "real" herding. This is at
least partly because it is hard to say what constitutes as a change in fundamentals and
in addition it is challenging to measure and quantify changes in fundamentals. Also, as
previously stated, even if changes in fundamentals are observed, it is difficult to separate
which part of e.g. price changes is justifiable with changes in fundamentals and which
part is attributable to herding. (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000)
2.4 Herding measures
In the market as a whole, all trades net to zero. For every stock sold there is a stock
bought. Thus, if the data studied is about trades or changes in portfolio composition,
market-wide herding cannot be observed. Instead herding can be measured within a
subgroup of investors. The most common herding measure used with this type of data
is the measure developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) (LSV from here on
after). Some measures also try to capture market-wide herding. Examples of these mea-
sures are the CSSD developed by Christie and Huang (1995) and the CSAD developed
by Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000).
2.4.1 The LSV herding measure
One of the most commonly used herding measures is the so-called LSV herding mea-
sure developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992). It attempts to capture how
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many investors more were buying (or selling) stocks compared to the expected amount
of buyers (or sellers). The basic formulation for the measure is as follows:
H =
 BB + S   p
  AF; (2.1)
where
AF = E
 BB + S   p
: (2.2)
B is the amount of net buyers of a specific stock within a specified time interval, while S is
the amount of net sellers of the same stock withing the same interval. p is the proportion
of buyers (of all active investors) of any stock within the same time interval and AF is the
adjustment factor. This herding measure is computed for each combination of stock and
time intervals and then averaged across different subgroups (Lakonishok, Shleifer and
Vishny 1992).
In a given time interval (e.g. quarter, month or day) there should not necessarily be the
exact same number of buyers and sellers of each stock. The amount of net buyers over
all stock in a single time interval varies, thus a different p is calculated for each interval.
The null hypothesis is that there is no herding. The adjustment factor AF is included,
because even if there is no herding, the absolute value of B/(B+S) - p is greater than
0. AF is the expected value of this absolute value term and it is calculated using a
binomial distribution. The actual process through which the LSV measure is calculated is
presented next.
Let us go through the terms in the formulas using examples. Let’s set our time period as
week 26 in 2005 and the stock we are calculating the LSV measure for is Nokia. Now, B
is the number of investors who are net buyers of Nokia during week 26 of 2005. S is the
equivalent number of net sellers. p is the number of net buyers of all stocks during week
26 in 2005 divided with the number of active investors in week 26 in 2005. p gives us a
reference level of sorts; has the Nokia stock seen more buying or selling than the average
stock during that same time? p is calculated again for each week. Then p is subtracted
from BB+S . If Nokia has been bought in excess amounts, this difference is positive. If,
on the other hand, Nokia has been sold more than the average stock, this difference is
negative. Both may be evidence of herding, and because of this, the absolute value of
this difference is considered.
The adjustment factor (AF) is included because some deviation from the average buying
propensity p is always expected. The adjustment factor is the expected value of the
previously presented absolute value term. The method for calculating the AF is presented
well in Jones, Lee and Weis (1999) and summarized here.
Let us suppose that in a given time period (month, week, quarter...) investors bought and
sold stocks in similar amounts, so that p = 0.5. Then let us suppose that the Nokia stock
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Table 2.1. Calculating the adjustment factor with 2 active investors. Taken from Jones,
Lee and Weis (1999).
# of buys Probability Value Product
(n!  (p)exp(k)  (1  p)exp(n  k))
([(n  k)!  k!])
 B(B + S)   p

0 0.25 |0/2-0.50| 0.125
1 0.50 |1/2-0.50| 0.000
2 0.25 |2/2-0.50| 0.125
AF 0.250
had only two investors active in it during this time period. The adjustment factor for the
Nokia stock is the expected value of BB+S   p and it’s calculation is presented in table 2.1.
As previously stated, the adjustment factor decreases when the number of active in-
vestors goes up. To demonstrate this, let us now suppose that the are five active investors
in the stock. This calculation is presented in 2.2.
Table 2.2. Calculating the adjustment factor with 5 active investors. Taken from Jones,
Lee and Weis (1999).
# of buys Probability Value Product
(n!  (p)exp(k)  (1  p)exp(n  k))
([(n  k)!  k!])
 B(B + S)   p

0 0.03125 |0/5-0.50| 0.016
1 0.15625 |1/5-0.50| 0.047
2 0.31250 |2/5-0.50| 0.031
3 0.31250 |3/5-0.50| 0.031
4 0.15625 |4/5-0.50| 0.047
5 0.03125 |5/5-0.50| 0.016
AF 0.188
As can be seen from comparing tables 2.1 and 2.2, when the number of active investors
increases, the adjustment factor decreases. This was also noted by Frey, Herbst and
Walter (2014) and Wylie (2005). It is noteworthy that, if Frey, Herbst and Walter (2014)
are correct and the AF over corrects, and is more pronounced with smaller amounts of
active traders, and small cap stocks have a smaller amount of active traders, it might be
that LSV herding results for small cap stocks are systematically too low. It is important
to keep this in mind when considering the low amount of active institutional investors,
especially in small cap stocks.
15
With all these terms now calculated, we can solve the LSV herding measure for a single
stock-week combination (Nokia during week 26 in 2005). This procedure is now repeated
for all stock-week-combinations, meaning that 103 stocks and 4 years result in over 21
000 separate stock-week observations. After the LSV measure for each stock-week is
calculated, further classification into buy herding measure (BHM) and sell herding mea-
sure (SHM) as in e.g. Wermers (1999) and Hsieh (2013) is made. They are conditional
measures and defined as follows:
BHM = H
 B
B + S
> p (2.3)
and
SHM = H
 B
B + S
< p: (2.4)
This is done to simplify later regression model calculations. The regressions will model
the relationship between the LSV measure and both past and future returns and volatil-
ities. Here having only one herding measure without regard to its direction would be
problematic: if, for example, high past returns lead to buy herding and low past returns
lead to sell herding, this would not be accurately captured in the regression model since
both low and high returns would result in a high herding measure.
The herding measure given by the LSV measure is quite easily interpreted. For exam-
ple, in their original paper Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) get a mean herding
measure of 2.7%. This means that if p, the average amount of buyers, was 0.5, then in
the average stock 52.7 % of the subgroup of investors under investigation were changing
there holdings in the same direction.
The mean herding measure of 2.7 % by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) can be
considered quite low and at most evidence of weak herding among money managers
between 1985 and 1989. Similar low results have been gotten by e.g. Grinblatt, Titman
and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999). A somewhat higher result of 3.3 % has been
reported by Brown, K. D. Wei and Wermers (2013) when using data from 1994 to 2003.
Significantly higher results have been reported by e.g. Kim and S.-J. Wei (2002) and
Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) regarding international investors, 13.2 % and over 20 %,
respectively. Hsieh (2013) reports numbers of 16.92 % for institutional investors and 6.73
% for individual investors.
The LSV herding measure has also received some criticism. Bikhchandani and Sharma
(2000) state that LSV uses only the number of investors to assess herding, with no regard
to how much stock they buy or sell. In a situation where there is an equal amount of
buyers and sellers, but buyers demand a higher amount of stocks, LSV would not find
any herding while in reality there is buy-side herding. They also criticize that LSV cannot
measure whether the exact same investors continue to herd over time. They also point
that choosing the herding interval (e.g. quarter, month, week) is very important. If the
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average time between trades is a quarter or more, then choosing a quarter as the time
interval if justified. If, on the other hand, trades are done more often (e.g. monthly), then
a quarter is too long a time interval to capture herding. Since many studies have only
quarterly data available, this might be an issue. For example, both Kim and S.-J. Wei
(2002) and Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) study herding during the Korean crisis in 1996 -
1997. Kim and S.-J. Wei (2002) use monthly intervals and get a herding measure of 6.23
% for foreign investors. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) use daily intervals and get a results
of over 20 % for foreign investors. Wylie (2005) points out that the LSV measure expects
short selling to be possible for all investors, which might not be the case. Wylie (2005)
also says that the LSV ignores money inflows to mutual funds. This inflow of new money
forces managers to make new buys, which might be seen as an increase in the herding
measure. On the other hand, even if fund managers are forced to make new buys, they
are not forced to buy the same stocks as other managers. Bikhchandani and Sharma
(2000) also say that while the LSV is called a herding measure, it actually measures the
correlation of trading patterns for a group of trades. And while herding leads to correlated
trading, the reverse may not be true.
The mathematical formulation of the LSV measure has also been under some scrutiny.
Frey, Herbst and Walter (2014) state that while the LSV measure is well suited to study
whether there is herding (i.e. is the herding measure 6= 0), it is less well suited in mea-
suring the actual amount of herding. They claim that when there is herding, the LSV
measure is biased downwards. They show that the adjustment factor in LSV overcor-
rects and leads to an understatement of herding. They also show that the bias decreases
when the number of trades increases. Thus the bias is more pronounced with smaller
trade amounts. Wylie (2005) has used the LSV measure to study herding in the UK,
and he also observes that when the number of active investors increases, the herding
measure increases too. It is possible that at least some of this observed increase in the
herding measure stems from the bias in the adjustment factor. To correct this bias, Frey,
Herbst and Walter (2014) suggest using square values instead of absolute values. They
have defined the new measure:
FHW2j;t =
 
B
B + S
  p
2
  E
"
B
B + S
  p
2#! Ij;t
Ij;t   1 ; (2.5)
where Ij;t is the amount of active investors for stock j. For a time period of t - 1; t and
universe of J stocks, the average FHW measure is
FHWt =
vuut 1
J
JX
j=1
FHW 2j;t: (2.6)
Frey, Herbst and Walter (2014) claim that their measure is superior to the LSV measure
in terms of the mean square error for as little as only 20 observations and 5 managers
trading a stock. They also point out that their measure is less well suited to testing the
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existence of herding. They suggest first using the LSV measure to test for the existence
of herding, and if herding if found, then use their measure to test the level of herding.
However, Bellando (2010) tested the FHW measure more and claims that it is unbiased
only with certain assumptions made by Frey, Herbst and Walter (2014). He claims that
as soon as the probability of no herding is not 0 or when there is some asymmetry, the
FHW measure is biased upward. Thus it seems that the LSV measure is in some cases
biased downwards, while the FHW measure is biased upwards. Merli and Roger (2013)
comments that when using these measures it is impossible to know the true value of
herding; however we know that the true value of herding is somewhere in between the
results given by LSV and FHW.
2.4.2 The CSSD and CSAD herding measures
Both the CSSD (cross-sectional standard deviation) and the CSAD (cross-sectional ab-
solute deviation) are measures which are based on the deviation of stock returns. The
CSSD was introduced by Christie and Huang (1995) and the CSAD by Chang, Cheng
and Khorana (2000). Both measures try to find herding by comparing the actual returns
to what would be expected if investors were fully rational and there would be no herding.
Christie and Huang (1995) were the first to study herding through the dispersion of stock
returns. They claim that during periods of markets stress and large price changes the
dispersion of returns should increase if there is no herding. This is because different
assets differ in their sensitivity to the market return. In the capital asset pricing model
this sensitivity is described with . For example, if the market return is 10 %, then a
stock with a  of 2 should see a return of 20 %. Similarly, a different stock with a  of
0.5 should see a return of 5 %. Christie and Huang (1995) thus state that if assets are
priced rationally, then during large changes in market returns the dispersion of individual
asset returns would increase. Correspondingly, in the presence of herding, investors
would reject these rational models and the returns for all individual assets would converge
towards the market return. This would mean that the dispersion of returns decreases.
Thus they conclude that a decrease in the dispersion of individual returns during periods
of market stress and large changes in market return would be evidence of herding. In
their research Christie and Huang (1995) focus on periods of market stress because
they deduce that herd behavior is most likely to emerge during these periods of unusual
market movements. Mathematically the CSSD herding measure is defined as
CSSDt =
sPN
i=1 (ri;t   rt)2
N   1 : (2.7)
Here N is the number of stocks being observed, ri is the return of a individual stock during
time t and rt is the average return of all N stocks during time t.
The CSSD measure also has some drawbacks, some of which are mentioned by Christie
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and Huang (1995) themselves. While herding might lead to a small CSSD value, a small
CSSD value is not necessarily evidence of herding. For example, if there is no new
information about the observed stock during time t, the dispersion in returns would be
low without any herding taking place. Also, in their research Christie and Huang (1995)
compare especially the dispersion in periods of "extreme" markets returns to the average
dispersion. They have defined "extreme" as being in the 1 % or 5 % tails of all ob-
served trading days. This definition of extreme is arbitrary, as stated by the researchers
themselves. Hwang and Salmon (2004) also point out that focusing on these periods of
"extreme" returns may exclude some herding. For example, there might be large price
changes in different sectors during the same time (e.g. financial institution stocks going
down while technology stocks going up) which would balance each other out when look-
ing at the market as a whole. Thus there may be significant reallocation of funds without
large changes in the average market return. Focusing only on "extreme" days would
exclude these examples of herding (Hwang and Salmon 2004). Also Richards (1999)
criticizes the CSSD (and the soon to be presented CSAD) by stating that they only look
for a certain kind of herding and only using data on returns. He states that there may be
other types of herding present which the CSSD measure will not pick up. Thus, according
to Richards (1999), the absence of evidence on herding gained with the CSSD should
not be taken as evidence of there being no herding at all.
The CSAD is a related measure developed by Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000). It
is based on the same idea as CSSD and looks for differences in the dispersion of re-
turns. Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) go further than Christie and Huang (1995) and
suggest that the return dispersion does not only increase with the market returns, but it
increases linearly. While a decrease in return dispersion with large average price move-
ments is still considered evidence of herding, also a decrease in the rate of dispersion
increase will also be considered evidence of herding. So even a decrease in the ex-
pected linear relation between return dispersion and the market return could be evidence
of herding. Mathematically the CSAD is defined as
CSADt =
PN
i=1 jri;t   rtj
N
: (2.8)
Here N is the number of stocks being observed, ri;t is the return of a individual stock
during time t and rt is the average return of all N stocks during time t.
Neither the CSSD or the CSAD are herding measures in themselves. Instead, they are
used as a part of a regression. Christie and Huang (1995) use the following regression
in their paper:
CSSDt = + 1D
L
t + 2D
U
t + t; (2.9)
where DLt = 1 if the market return on day t is the extreme lower tail on the distribution
and 0 otherwise
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and
DUt = 1 if the market return on day t is the extreme upper tail on the distribution and 0
otherwise.
Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) utilize the following regressions:
CSADUPt = + 
UP
1
rUPt + UP2 rUPt 2 + t; (2.10)
CSADDOWNt = + 
DOWN
1
rDOWNt + DOWN2 rDOWNt 2 + t; (2.11)
where
rUPt  (or rDOWNt ) is the absolute value of equally weighted returns of all observed
assets on days when the market is up (or down).
Using these measures Christie and Huang (1995) find no evidence of herding in US
stocks during periods of market stress in 1925 to 1988. Using data for multiple mar-
kets, Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) find significant evidence of herding in South
Korea and Taiwan, partial evidence for herding in Japan and no evidence for herding in
the US and Hong Kong. The advantages of the CSSD or CSAD measures lie in the
good availability of data and on the fact that they are based on rational pricing models.
The drawbacks include the ability to find only certain kind of herding and the inability to
pinpoint herding to certain investor groups or securities.
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3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The empirical portion of this Master’s Thesis consists of measuring herding using the LSV
herding measure. This section discusses the research philosophy behind this thesis, and
presents the data and methods used.
The research philosophy underlying this thesis is most closely linked to positivism. This
thesis focuses on what can be measured and tries to produce credible and meaningful
data. This is quite clear in the selection of the used method: using quantitative data which
is studied through statistical methods. The results are compared with earlier research and
existing theories about herding. As the researcher, I aim to minimize the effect of my own
values in the results. It must be noted that this is not completely possible, since some
choices always have to be made. For example, the choice of which herding measure to
use and which time period to choose reflect my own values and beliefs, even though I
have tried to base these choices in earlier research. Also, because this study takes place
in the field of behavioral finance, the role of human interaction and psychology cannot
be passed. This mean that the are also critical realist research features present. As
mentioned in Saunders (2016), "critical realist research therefore focuses on providing
an explanation for observable organisational events by looking for the underlying causes
and mechanisms through which deep social structures shape everyday organisational
life". When researching the reasons behind herding, some social aspects always come
into play.
This thesis’ approach to theory development has features of both the inductive and the
abductive approach. Saunders (2016) states that "if your research starts by collecting
data to explore a phenomenon and you generate or build theory (often in the form of a
conceptual framework), then you are using an inductive approach". This is at least partly
the case in this thesis. On the other hand, Saunders (2016) also states that "abduction
begins with the observation of a ‘surprising fact’; it then works out a plausible theory of
how this could have occurred". In this thesis this is also true, and drawing a line between
the use of these approaches is very difficult and maybe even unnecessary.
This thesis has a quantitative approach. This is a mono method quantitative study, since
only one data collection technique is used (Saunders 2016). This study is also best char-
acterised as descripto-explanatory, since it has two somewhat separate angles: first, has
there been herding in the Finnish stock market and second, is there a link between returns
(or volatility) and herding? This means there is a description of the situation (e.g. there
has been herding in the Finnish stock market) and also maybe an explanation for this (e.g.
21
there is a correlation between recent returns and herding). The research strategy used
mostly resembles an experiment strategy. As Saunders (2016) state, "the purpose of an
experiment is to study the probability of a change in an independent variable causing a
change in another, dependent variable". While the data used in this study has not been
collected specifically for this use, a large part of this study focuses on the relationship
between herding and stock returns, and herding and volatility. Time horizon wise, this
study is a longitudinal one, since the data does not represent a "snapshot" of a certain
time but instead allows us to study how herding has changed as time went on.
3.1 The data
The data set in use is provided by Euroclear Finland Oy (previously Finnish Central Se-
curity Depository). The data set contains daily level records of investor’s trades and
portfolios, including all Finnish households, Finnish institutions and some foreign institu-
tions. The data is on a transaction level, so each purchase and sale is separated, even
if they happen within the same day. The daily level records are duplicates of the official
certificates of ownership and trades and thus reliable. This data spans 15 years, from
1995 to 2009. In addition to this, there is additional data spanning 6 years, from 2010 to
2016. This data is also on a daily level, but transactions are reported as net transactions,
where the purchases and sales of the same stock are summarized.
This data reports the shareholdings of all Finnish investors, both retail and institutional,
who have traded in Finland. The book entry system requires registration of holdings
for all Finnish individuals and institutions. Foreign investors are partially relieved from
this registration because they can choose to be registered under a nominee name. If
they register under a nominee name, the foreign investors cannot be separated from
each other. The same data from different time periods has been used in many articles,
including Baltakys, Baltakiene˙ et al. (2019), Baltakys, Kanniainen and Emmert-Streib
(2018), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Siikanen et al.
(2018).
The data set is very comprehensive and includes a lot of information relating to each
trade. The data includes investor-specific ID’s, the ISIN code for the traded stock, infor-
mation on the transaction itself (buy/sell, volume, trading date, registration date, price)
and sector codes identifying households and different types of institutions. For individ-
ual investors the data also includes date of birth, gender, postal code, language and tax
payer status. Much of this data is not relevant in the scope of this thesis. Some dummy
data with relevant columns is presented in table 3.1.
The data set is located in a SQL database. In addition to this transaction data some price
data is also used. The price data is from Nasdaq and it includes daily closing prices for
all stocks listed in the Helsinki stock exchange from 1995 to 2009 (or for a shorter period
if the stock is listed or de-listed within this time period). The prices have been adjusted
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Table 3.1. Dummy data depicting relevant columns of the Euroclear data.
owner
id
sector
code
holding
type
isin volume transaction
type
trading date
1001 100 1 FI0009502101 500 10 6.9.2004 10:30
1001 100 1 FI0009502103 350 20 11.10.2004 12:42
5001 200 1 FI0009501234 300 10 6.9.2004 10:24
for splits and dividends.
3.1.1 Arguments for data cuts chosen
The main goal of this thesis is to use the LSV herding measure to study whether there
has been herding in Finnish stocks between 1.7.2005 and 30.6.2009. In addition to this
main goal, analyses on the relation between herding and stock returns, and herding and
volatility are conducted. Because of the large size of the data set in use, some subset of
the data must be chosen for further analysis.
The time period of 1.7.2005 - 30.6.2009 was chosen mainly for two reasons. First, it
includes a time period prior to the financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 and a time period during
the crisis. This makes it possible to compare herding measures between non-crisis and
crisis periods. The period from 1.7.2005 to 30.6.2007 is considered to be the pre-crisis
period, while 1.7.2007 - 30.6.2009 is considered to be the crisis period. To clarify the
difference between these two periods in the stock markets, figure 3.1 shows the develop-
ment of the OMX Helsinki 25 stock index during these periods. Second, this time period
fits well with some qualities of the data. The main table in the data set in use spans from
1995 to 2009, but it has some problems with data quality during the period of 2000 - mid
2007. For this period there is a different table with better quality data. Choosing these two
periods (pre-crisis and crisis) allows for simpler extraction of data. All of the transaction
data for the pre-crisis period (1.7.2005 - 30.6.2007) can be extracted from the data set
containing good quality data for the period of 2000 - 30.6.2007. In the same manner, all
of the transaction data for the crisis period (1.7.2007 - 30.6.2009) can be extracted from
the larger data set, because for this time period the data has good quality.
Another time-related question is what time period is chosen for calculating the LSV mea-
sure. As mentioned in section 2, the choice herding interval may significantly affect the
results (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000; Choe, Kho and Stulz 1999; Kim and S.-J. Wei
2002). Many previous studies have used a quarter as the herding interval; this is mainly
due to the fact that they have had only quarterly data available. The data set in use for
this thesis would theoretically allow the use of a single day as the herding interval. But
which interval length is most suited for finding herding?
If herding is defined as investors copying the actions of other investors, then investors
have to be aware of the actions of other. In this regard a day might be too short. It seems
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Figure 3.1. The development of the OMX Helsinki 25 index from 1.7.2005 to 30.6.2009.
The red line marks the transition from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period.
unlikely that institutional investors would follow each others’ trades on daily basis and
then execute their own trades during the same day. The same may apply for households:
it seems likely that the information about the trades of others (peers, institutions) takes
some time to diffuse into the individual investor population. Households may also face
some constraints regarding liquidity: they may not have cash on hand every day to make
purchases. For these reasons a day seems to be too short of an interval to accurately
measure herding. A quarter, on the other hand, may be too long. Because the LSV
herding measure uses net buyers and sellers, investors who first buy and then sell (or
vice versa) the same amount of stock during the herding interval are not registered by the
measure. It is also not impossible to imagine a scenario where, during a single quarter,
investors first herd to buy a certain stock and then herd to sell it. This would not be picked
up by the LSV measure, even though significant herding might have actually occurred.
Institutional investors may also re-balance their portfolios more than once a quarter, which
also makes a quarter too long of a time interval to study herding.
For this study a week is chosen as the herding interval. It can be considered long enough
so that information on the trades of others is diffused into the investor population, but
short enough so that trades might have an actual correlation. Choosing a week as the
herding interval also decreases the probability of missing intra-period herding. The aver-
age number of weekly active investors for the whole study period of 1.7.2005 - 30.6.2009
is 11 792. This is definitely enough to get reliable results. Shorter herding intervals are of
more interest also because most data sets do not contain data at this level. This creates
an excellent opportunity to study herding with shorter intervals and perhaps create new
understanding about the optimal interval for studying herding. However, just to be sure
some sensitivity analysis was conducted with different period lengths. Another suitable
period considered for this study was a month. When the calculations were made with
a month as the herding interval no significant differences in the amount of herding was
found compared to the results obtained when using a week as the herding interval.
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The choice of which stocks to focus on is also important. Some previous studies have
chosen to focus on e.g. 16 largest stocks (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000) to avoid skewed
results possibly caused by the illiquidity of smaller stocks. In this thesis, however, no
such limitations are used. The stocks to be studied are chosen as follows: first, all stocks
that are traded in the Helsinki stock exchange on December 2006 are listed. This date
is chosen because of some limitations of data; the Nasdaq website does not contain
records older than this. From this pool of stocks some additional omissions have to be
made for each of the periods (pre-crisis and crisis). For the pre-crisis period (1.7.2005 -
30.6.2007), we only include stocks that are listed for that whole period. If a stock is listed
or delisted during that period, it is omitted. For the crisis period (1.7.2007 - 30.6.2009) we
start with the pool of stocks used for the pre-crisis period and do similar omissions. This
means a few more stocks are omitted from the crisis period because of their delisting
during that period. Second, for the regression analysis on the relationship between the
LSV herding measure and stock returns, data on the returns of one previous year and
one future year is needed. Since the study period is 1.7.2005 - 30.6.2009, this means that
for the regression analysis price data is needed from 1.7.2004 to 30.6.2010. Because of
this additional limitation, some stocks are omitted from the study.
With these omissions made, we are left with 103 stocks for the pre-crisis period and
99 stocks for the crisis period. Even with some omissions we are still left with a good
number of stocks representing companies of different sizes and industries. The 28 large
cap stocks are listed in table 3.2 and the 37 mid cap stocks in table 3.3. 38 small cap
stocks were included in the pre-crisis period from 1.7.2005 to 30.6.2007 but only 34 for
the crisis period from 1.7.2007 - 30.6.2009. These stock are listed in table 3.4.
As previously stated, the LSV herding measure cannot identify market wide herding. A
subgroup of investors must be chosen to properly measure herding. Bikhchandani and
Sharma (2000) say that to examine herding, one should find a sufficiently homogeneous
group of investors. If investors within this group act similarly and face similar decision
problems, then herding is more likely to arise. This group cannot also be too large com-
pared to the whole market. If the group represents e.g. 80% of the market, then it is likely
that buyers and sellers are both represented in this group in equal amounts. Common
subgroups in previous literature include mutual funds (Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers
1995; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1992), foreign investors (Kim and S.-J. Wei 2002)
and individual investors (i.e. households) (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000). Because of
the sector codes present in the data, in this thesis it is possible to compare the herding
of different subgroups of investors. The investor subgroups chosen are households and
institutional investors. For households only one sector code is used in the data, so the
separation of household investors is quite straightforward. However, multiple sector codes
are used for different types of institutional investors. The following 13 investor groups are
classified as institutional investors and are used in this study: financial and insurance
corporations, Bank of Finland, other monetary financial institutions, deposit money cor-
porations, money market funds, financial institutions practicing financial intermediation,
other financial intermediaries, insurance corporations, social security funds, employment
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Table 3.2. The 28 large cap stocks included in this study and their respective industries.
Stock Industry Market cap
Amer Sports Oyj Consumer Discretionary Large cap
Elisa Oyj Telecommunication Services Large cap
Fortum Oyj Utilities Large cap
Huhtamäki Oyj Materials Large cap
Kemira Oyj Materials Large cap
Kesko Oyj A Consumer Staples Large cap
Kesko Oyj B Consumer Staples Large cap
Metso Oyj Industrials Large cap
M-real Oyj A Materials Large cap
M-real Oyj B Materials Large cap
Nokia Oyj Information Technology Large cap
Nokian Renkaat Oyj Consumer Discretionary Large cap
Nordea Bank AB FDR Financials Large cap
OKO A Financials Large cap
Outokumpu Oyj Materials Large cap
Rautaruukki Oyj K Materials Large cap
Sampo A Financials Large cap
SanomaWSOY Consumer Discretionary Large cap
Stockmann Oyj Abp A Consumer Discretionary Large cap
Stockmann Oyj Abp B Consumer Discretionary Large cap
Stora Enso A Materials Large cap
Stora Enso R Materials Large cap
TeliaSonera Telecommunication Services Large cap
TietoEnator Information Technology Large cap
UPM-Kymmene Oyj Materials Large cap
Uponor Oyj Industrials Large cap
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp B Industrials Large cap
YITOyj Industrials Large cap
pension schemes, other social security funds, non-profit institutions serving households
and state churches. In this study investments made under a nominee registered holding
are excluded. Only normal holdings are considered.
Of these groups, households are of special interest. Few studies have been made about
the herding of households, since data on household trades is rarely available. Some
notable exceptions to this are Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Kyrolainen and Pert-
tunen (2003), both using Finnish data. During the study period there were 1 374 active
weekly household investors. Similarly there were 119 active weekly institutional investors.
Though it must be noted that when looking at institutional investors and small cap stocks,
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Table 3.3. The 37 mid cap stocks included in this study and their respective industries.
Stock Industry Market cap
Aldata Solution Oyj Information Technology Mid cap
Aspo Oyj Industrials Mid cap
Atria Yhtymä Oyj A Consumer Staples Mid cap
Basware Oyj Information Technology Mid cap
CapMan Oyj B Financials Mid cap
Citycon Oyj Financials Mid cap
Comptel Oyj Information Technology Mid cap
Cramo Industrials Mid cap
Elcoteq SE A Information Technology Mid cap
Elektrobit Group Oyj Information Technology Mid cap
Exel Oyj Materials Mid cap
Finnair Oyj Industrials Mid cap
Finnlines Oyj Industrials Mid cap
Fiskars Oyj Abp A Consumer Discretionary Mid cap
Fiskars Oyj Abp K Consumer Discretionary Mid cap
F-Secure Oyj Information Technology Mid cap
HK Ruokatalo Group A Consumer Staples Mid cap
Ilkka-Yhtymä 2 Consumer Discretionary Mid cap
KCI Konecranes Oyj Industrials Mid cap
Kyro Oyj Abp Industrials Mid cap
Lassila & Tikanoja Industrials Mid cap
Lemminkäinen Oyj Industrials Mid cap
PKC Group Oyj Industrials Mid cap
Ponsse 1 Industrials Mid cap
Pöyry Oyj Industrials Mid cap
Raisio Oyj Vaihto-osake Consumer Staples Mid cap
Ramirent Oyj Industrials Mid cap
Rapala VMC Consumer Discretionary Mid cap
Scanfil Oyj Information Technology Mid cap
Sponda Oyj Financials Mid cap
Talentum Oyj Consumer Discretionary Mid cap
Tamfelt Etu Industrials Mid cap
Technopolis Oyj Financials Mid cap
Teleste Oyj Information Technology Mid cap
Vacon Oyj Industrials Mid cap
Vaisala Oyj A Information Technology Mid cap
Ålandsbanken Abp B Financials Mid cap
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Table 3.4. The 38 small cap stocks included in this study and their respective industries.
The 4 stocks market with an asterisk (*) are only present in the pre-crisis period and
omitted from the crisis period.
Stock Industry Market cap
AffectoGenimap Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Amanda Capital Oyj Financials Small cap
Aspocomp Group Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Benefon S Information Technology Small cap
Biohit Oyj B Health Care Small cap
Biotie Therapies Oyj Health Care Small cap
Birka Line Abp B* Consumer Discretionary Small cap
Cencorp Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Componenta Oyj Industrials Small cap
Done Solutions Oyj Industrials Small cap
Efore Oyj Industrials Small cap
eQ* Financials Small cap
Etteplan Oyj Industrials Small cap
Evox Rifa Group Oyj* Information Technology Small cap
Incap Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Lännen Tehtaat Oyj Consumer Staples Small cap
Marimekko Oyj Consumer Discretionary Small cap
Norvestia Oyj Financials Small cap
Okmetic Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Olvi Oyj A Consumer Staples Small cap
Proha Oyj Information Technology Small cap
QPR Software Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Raute Oyj A Industrials Small cap
Ruukki Group Oyj Industrials Small cap
Satama Interactive Information Technology Small cap
Solteq Oyj Information Technology Small cap
SSH Communications Information Technology Small cap
Stonesoft Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Stromsdal Oyj* Materials Small cap
Suominen Yhtymä Oyj Consumer Staples Small cap
SysOpen Digia Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Tecnomen Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Tekla Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Tieto-X Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Tiimari Industrials Small cap
TJ Group Oyj Information Technology Small cap
Tulikivi Oyj A Industrials Small cap
Turvatiimi Oyj Industrials Small cap
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there were weeks with only 1 active investor. Indeed, with small cap stocks and institu-
tional investors, the average amount of active investors was only 13.6 per week. Such
low investors amounts create problems for the reliability of results regarding the herding
of institutional investors. The results are presented in chapter 4 where their reliability is
also examined more closely. On the other hand, the groups (households and institutions)
do not represent too large a part of the market. Thus it is more likely that they act together
as a homogeneous group and their herding may differ from the average herding in the
market.
It has also been suggested that company size may affect herding propensity. Bikhchan-
dani and Sharma (2000) point out that herding is usually lower in large capitalization
stocks. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) also find that herding is more pronounced
in small capitalization stocks. Wermers (1999) comes to a similar conclusion. Different
reasons for this have been suggested. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggests
that this may be because money managers "window-dress" their portfolios and sell off
small, obscure and poorly performing stocks. This would be consistent with the reputa-
tional herding theory presented by Scharfstein, Stein et al. (1990). Vice versa, money
managers might be inclined to buy well performing small stocks because their higher
capitalization increases their liquidity and analyst coverage. More herding in smaller cap-
italization stocks is also consistent with the informational cascade theory (Bikhchandani
and Sharma 2000). If there is less public information available on smaller stocks, then the
investment decisions of others may be observed and followed more closely. In this thesis
the stocks are grouped into 3 different size categories: large, mid and small capitalization.
This grouping is based on the size cutoff points used by Nasdaq (large = market value
of over 1 billion euros, mid = market value between 150 million and 1 billion euros, small
= market value below 150 million euros) and stocks are classified based on their size in
December 2006.
Another grouping of interest is the amount of herding by industry. The industry classifica-
tion used is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) used by Nasdaq and
maintained by the FTSE group. The ICB system classifies companies based on which
activity or business area generates the largest proportion of revenue for the company.
A question of interest is whether industries vary in the amount of herding, or if herd-
ing around a specific industry changes within the observed time period. For example,
the financial crisis was especially hard for many banks and financial institutions. Thus it
might be that herding around the financial industry increases in the beginning of the crisis
period.
3.2 Use of the LSV measure
The LSV herding measure was chosen for this thesis because it is (1) the most commonly
used herding measure and (2) easily implemented with the type of data that is available.
The widespread use of the LSV measure is evidence of at least some level of acceptance
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Figure 3.2. A visualization of how different time periods used in the regression models
do not overlap.
by the scientific community. In addition, having multiple previous results available makes
it possible to contrast and compare new results with the old results. While Frey, Herbst
and Walter (2014) and Bellando (2010) have criticized the LSV measure and suggested
improvements, these suggestions are not utilized in this thesis. Not a lot of research
or commentary has been made on the work of either Frey, Herbst and Walter (2014) or
Bellando (2010). Thus at the moment there is little evidence that their suggestions will ac-
tually improve the LSV measure. Even if e.g. the measure suggested by Frey, Herbst and
Walter (2014) would yield more accurate results, comparing them to the results found in
previous herding literature would be difficult. On the other hand, if the critique presented
by both Frey, Herbst and Walter (2014) and Bellando (2010) is correct and the LSV mea-
sure is biased downwards, and significant herding is found nevertheless, this would only
make the results more robust.
3.3 Regression models
In this thesis, a mixed effects model is used to study the relationship between herding
and returns, and herding and volatility. Two different analyses are made for each group.
First, the relationship between past returns (or volatility) and herding is studied. Here the
BHM and SHM, which are based LSV herding measure, are the dependent variables and
past returns act as the explanatory variables. Different periods for past returns are used.
Past returns are calculated for the previous 1 year, 6 months, 3 months, 1 month, 1 week
and current week periods. Second, this relationship is flipped, using the BHM and SHM
as the explanatory variables and future returns as the dependent variable. Future returns
are also calculated for different periods: 1 year, 6 months, 3 months, 1 month and 1 week
into the future. The periods have been calculated so that no overlapping occurs. This is
visualized in figure 3.2.
In both analyses the specific stock and year-week combination are used as random ef-
fects. When the relationship between past returns and herding is examined, the different
periods of past returns are the fixed effects.
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For example, the mathematical notation for studying the relationship between sell-side
herding and past returns with all time periods included looks like this:
SHMt =+ 1 Rt 126;t 252 + 2 Rt 64;t 125 + 3 Rt 21;t 63+
4 Rt 6;t 20 + 5 Rt 1;t 5 + 6 Rt;t+4 + isini + YearWeekn
(3.1)
where the different  ’s are fixed effect coefficients, isini is a stock-specific random effect
and Y earWeekn is a time-period-specific random effect. Here Rj;k is the return between
days j and k and it is defined as
Rj;k =
Sj   Sk
Sk
; (3.2)
where Sj is the stock price on day j and Sk is the stock price on day k. As mentioned, the
relationship between herding and volatility is also studied in a similar manner.
When the relationship between herding and future returns is studied, the herding mea-
sure is used as the fixed effect. This means that a new model is created for each different
time period. For example, when studying the relationship between sell-side herding and
future 1 week returns, the regression model is as follows:
Rt+4;t+9 = + SHMt;t+4 + isini + YearWeekn (3.3)
3.4 Reliability and validity
In all studies questions about the reliability and validity of the findings are of great impor-
tance. Saunders (2016) summarizes reliability and validity as follows:
“Reliability refers to replication and consistency. If a researcher is able to replicate an
earlier research design and achieve the same findings, then that research would be seen
as being reliable. In essence, validity refers to the appropriateness of the measures used,
accuracy of the analysis of the results and generalisability of the findings.”
The data and methods used in this study guarantee a fairly good reliability. It is my
belief that any researcher armed with the same data, and using the methods outlined
in this thesis, would achieve the same results. Validity, on the other hand, poses more
challenges.
First there is the question about measurement validity, i.e. does the LSV herding mea-
sure really measure herding? As previously mentioned, the LSV herding measure has
received some criticism despite it’s popularity. This critique is presented more thoroughly
in chapter 2. Most notably, as Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) point out, the LSV mea-
sures the correlation of trading patterns for a group of trades. While herding leads to
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correlated trading, all correlated trading may not be because of herding. The term "spu-
rious herding" is very relevant here. Just because the same stocks are sold or bought
at the same time, it does not necessarily mean that herding has occurred. It might be
that some new information has entered the market and many investors react to it the
same way independent of each other. To separate spurious herding from actual herding
is nearly impossible with the data that is available.
Second, the external validity of the results. Can the results be generalised to other mar-
kets or time periods? One must be very careful when making generalisations. For exam-
ple, if evidence of herding is found, that results is true only for the study period of 1.7.2005
to 30.6.2009. Based on the results of this thesis, one cannot say anything about the pos-
sible current amounts of herding in the Finnish stock market.
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4 HERDING RESULTS
In this chapter the results regarding herding are presented. The results are presented
and discussed in a few different sections: herding in time, herding by investor group and
herding by industry.
4.1 Herding in time
This study is split into two different time periods: pre-crisis period from 1.7.2005 to
30.6.2007 and crisis period from 1.7.2007 to 30.6.2009. One of the central questions
of this study is whether there is a difference in the amount of herding between these two
time periods.
The average LSV herding measure for all stocks and investors during the pre-crisis pe-
riod was 9.79 %. During the crisis period the average LSV herding rose to 10.40 %. The
average amount of herding for all stocks, all investors and the whole study period was
10.10 %. All numbers can be found in table 4.1. This amount of herding can be consid-
ered to be quite high. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) found that the
mean herding measure for money managers in the US between 1985 and 1989 was 2.7
%. Higher results have been reported by e.g. Kim and S.-J. Wei (2002) and Choe, Kho
and Stulz (1999). Kim and S.-J. Wei (2002) reported herding levels between 8.4 % and
13.2 % for individual foreign investors in Korea, but only levels between 4.8 % and 8.3 %
for resident individual investors. In their research the level of herding is generally lower
during the crisis period than the pre-crisis period. For their pre-crisis period Choe, Kho
and Stulz (1999) report herding levels of over 20 %. For their crisis period they report
slightly lower numbers, but still very high compared to earlier studies. Studying data from
Finland similar to what was now used, but from a different time period, Kyrolainen and
Perttunen (2003) also find relatively high levels of herding. They report numbers of 16.95
% and 13.7 % for the herding of passive investors in winner and loser stocks, respec-
tively. Hsieh (2013) reports relatively high numbers of 16.92 % for institutional investors
and 6.73 % for individual investors in Taiwan between 2002 and 2003.
Contrasted with these earlier results, the herding levels measured in this study can be
considered high, but not unprecedented. In fact, they are quite well in line with earlier
studies focusing on periods of crisis and smaller stock markets. One difference is that in
earlier studies herding usually decreased when moving from the pre-crisis period to the
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Table 4.1. LSV herding measures for all investors split by study period and stock capital-
ization. The standard deviation of the LSV measure also presented for each period and
stock capitalization.
2005 - 2007 2007 - 2009 2005 - 2009
All stocks 9.79 % 10.40 % 10.10 %
Std. of herding 11.86 % 13.31 % 12.60 %
Large cap 13.69 % 12.83 % 13.26 %
Std. of herding 12.61 % 12.92 % 12.77 %
Mid cap 9.85 % 10.47 % 10.16 %
Std. of herding 11.33 % 13.46 % 12.45 %
Small cap 6.85 % 8.32 % 7.59 %
Std. of herding 10.91 % 13.13 % 12.03 %
crisis period. In this study the level of herding increased slightly (from 9.79 % to 10.40 %).
Though it must be noted that the difference is small, and in large capitalization stocks the
level of herding actually decreased (from 13.69 % to 12.83 %). Some contrary results are
also presented in earlier research. Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela (2012), who studied
herding at the Spanish market, state that "herding intensity significantly increases in crisis
or down market periods". Also Klein (2013) found that herding increases during times of
crisis. While this increase from 9.79 % to 10.40 % reported in this study cannot be
called "significant", other results pointing in a similar direction do exist. There is also the
possibility that no two crisis are the same and thus the amount of herding in pre-crisis
and crisis periods does not follow a certain pattern, but instead varies from crisis to crisis.
The results also show lower amounts of herding for smaller capitalization stocks, with
large cap stocks having the highest herding and small cap stocks the lowest. This finding
contradicts some theories behind the reasons of herding. Generally it can be thought that
there is less information available on smaller capitalization stocks and that fewer analysts
follow them. According to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), informational cascades are
more likely when there is less public information available. Since there is less public
information available on smaller stocks, this would mean that informational cascades are
more likely to occur with small stocks. These results do not support this theory. On
the other hand, according to Graham (1999) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992),
investors may focus more on stocks which they believe also others are following. Since
large stocks have more analysts and other investors following them, this may drive more
investors to trade these stocks on the expense of smaller stocks. This theory would be in
line with the findings of this study. Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela (2012) also found that
large capitalization stocks experience more herding that small capitalization stocks. They
point out that Sias (2004) argues that the greater amount of information available on large
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capitalization stocks increases the chance of herding. Higher amounts of herding in large
capitalization stocks could happen because uninformed investors prefer large companies
over small ones because of their familiarity or because institutional investors invest mainly
in large companies. Similar results were also obtained by Lin, Tsai and Sun (2009), who
found that stocks with higher quality information available experience more herding, and
larger companies commonly have better quality information available on them. Lin, Tsai
and Sun (2009) also suggest that herding is caused by the "search cost effect", meaning
that investors trade stocks which have low search costs, i.e. large capitalization stocks.
The standard deviation of herding also increases when moving from the pre-crisis period
into the crisis period.
The difference between buy- and sell-side herding is also studied. As explained in chap-
ter 3, the buy herding measure (BHM) and sell herding measure (SHM) are conditional
measures based on the LSV measure and they were defined in equations 2.3 and 2.4.
Table 4.2 presents the results. When looking at the whole study period from 2005 to
2009 and all investors, sell-side herding is about 2.4 % larger. However, there is a clear
difference when looking at the pre-crisis and crisis periods separately. During the pre-
crisis period there is almost no difference between buy- and sell-side herding (only 0.05
p.p.’s). During the crisis period a clear gap emerges: BHM decreases to 7.23 % and
SHM increases to 12.11 %. This implies that during the crisis period sell-side herding
is a lot more common than buy-side herding. This is in line with Brown, K. D. Wei and
Wermers (2013), who found that funds are more likely to herd on the sell-side than on
the buy-side. Herding more on the sell-side seems to hold true at least in times of crisis.
Similar findings have been reported by Hsieh (2013), who found that sell-side herding is
more common than buy-side herding. On the other hand, Hsieh (2013) reports that sell-
side herding is even more common than buy-side herding during a bullish market than a
bearish market; this contradicts the findings of this thesis.
Table 4.2. Comparison between the average BHM’s and the SHM’s for all investors. The
standard deviations for both SHM and BHM and the correlation between SHM and BHM
are also presented.
2005-2007 2007-2009 2005-2009
SHM 9.59 % 12.11 % 10.86 %
Std. of SHM 2.02 % 3.59 % 3.18 %
BHM 9.64 % 7.23 % 8.42 %
Std. Of BHM 2.38 % 2.74 % 2.83 %
Corr. of SHM and BHM -0.1942 -0.4787 -0.4788
This change in the difference between BHM and SHM can clearly be seen in figure 4.1.
The figure shows the 5 week moving average of both BHM and SHM for all investors.
While there is some fluctuation during the pre-crisis period, the difference between the
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Figure 4.1. The 5 week moving averages of BHM and SHM. The period changes from
pre-crisis to crisis in week 26 in 2007.
pre-crisis and crisis periods is quite clear in the graph. The crisis period was defined to
begin from week 26 in 2007. The SHM and BHM are also negatively correlated with each
other; on average, when SHM increases, BHM decreases (and vice versa). This implies
there is rarely both sell-side and buy-side herding occurring at the same but instead
investors focus on either selling or buying during one week. This negative correlation
increases in strength when moving from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. This
implies that in market downturns this polarization between buying and selling is even
more pronounced.
To study this statistically, the variance of the 5 week moving averages was calculated.
For SHM, the pre-crisis period variance of the 5 week moving average is 0.01281. The
crisis period variance for SHM is 0.02459. For SHM there is a clear increase in variance
when moving from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. For BHM, the pre-crisis
period variance of the 5 week moving average is 0.01595. The crisis period variance
for BHM is 0.01944. While the SHM variance increased by 0.01178, the BHM variance
increased only 0.00350. For both the SHM and the BHM, the variance was larger in the
crisis period, but the difference is much greater with SHM. This can also be seen in table
4.2, where the standard deviation of both SHM and BHM increase when moving from
the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. In the crisis period the standard deviation of
SHM is also larger than the standard deviation of BHM. This increase in herding volatility,
especially with sell-side herding, implies that during some weeks in the crisis period a
significant amount of investors rush to sell the same stocks at the same time. This might
be because e.g. momentum investent strategies, where investors start to sell stocks that
have seen recent losses. It is also possible that this simultaneous selling is caused by a
change in fundamentals, if many companies report poor results at the same time.
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4.2 Herding by investor group
In addition to studying herding by all market participants, two groups of investors are
separated for closer inspection: household investors and institutional investors. An in-
teresting questions is if there is a difference between the average level of herding, the
herding of households and the herding of institutions, and how these results relate to
findings in earlier research.
The results for household investor herding are presented in table 4.3. Interestingly, the
herding levels of households are lower than those of the whole investor population, the
average herding in all stocks being 6.8 % (compared with 10.10 % for all investors). The
results follow the same pattern as before, with higher average herding in large capital-
ization stocks and lower herding in small capitalization stocks. The levels of herding are
lower than the whole investor populations’ also in each market capitalization group. For
all market capitalizations the standard deviation of herding increases when moving from
the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. On average, the amount of household investor
herding increases when moving from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. Simi-
lar results gave been reported by Hsieh (2013), who also found that individual investor
herding increased under "high pressure" market conditions. Goodfellow, Bohl and Gebka
(2009) also report that individual investors herd more during market downswings.
Table 4.3. Results for average household investor LSV herding measure by time period
and stock market capitalization. The standard deviation of the LSV herding measure is
also presented for each period and market capitalization.
2005-2007 2007-2009 2005-2009
All sizes 6.5 % 7.1 % 6.8 %
Std. of herding 14.5 % 17.2 % 15.8 %
Large cap 8.9 % 8.4 % 8.7 %
Std. of herding 13.7 % 15.1 % 14.4 %
Mid cap 6.2 % 6.9 % 6.6 %
Std. of herding 14.7 % 17.4 % 16.0 %
Small Cap 5.1 % 6.0 % 5.5 %
Std. of herding 14.7 % 18.6 % 16.5 %
The results for institutional investors are presented in table 4.4. The results for institutional
investors are lower still, with the average herding over all stocks being 5.7 %. Institutions
having lower levels of herding is in line with many previous articles. Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) report herding of 2.7 % for mutual funds, Wermers (1999) report 3.4
% and Brown, K. D. Wei and Wermers (2013) 3.3 %. Considering that they all study
US based funds and this paper studies the Finnish stock market, these somewhat higher
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levels of herding seem logical considering e.g. the difference in the amount of stock
choices. Also as previously mentioned, average levels of herding seem to be higher in
smaller, perhaps less developed, stock markets.
Herding by institutions seems to differ from the average herding in regards to different
market capitalizations. In the pre-crisis period there is almost no difference in herding
between mid cap and small cap stocks (3.7 % and 3.8 %). And during the crisis period all
three groups have almost the same level of herding (7.4 %, 7.5 % and 7.1 %). Also when
comparing to the whole investor population, the herding rose quite sharply (from 4.8 % to
7.4 %) between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. These results suggest that institutions
herd slightly more on larger capitalization stocks than smaller capitalization stocks. This
contradicts the findings of Hsieh (2013), who found that institutional investors herd more
on small capitalization stocks.
When comparing institutional investors to households, the average total levels of herding
are lower for institutions. However, in the crisis period the average level of herding for
institutions was higher than that of households. It this result is true, it would imply that
during the crisis institutional investors herded more than household investors. This con-
tradicts some earlier research, e.g. Kim and S.-J. Wei (2002). On the other hand, Hsieh
(2013) found that institutional investors herd more than individual investors.
Some reasons that could explain this are reputational concerns of professional investors,
window-dressing of portfolios during a bear market or characteristic herding. One must
still remember that the number of active weekly institutional investors was quite low for
some weeks of the data. This lowers the reliability of these results. As with household
investors, the standard deviation of herding increases for all market capitalizations when
moving from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. The standard deviation of herding
is also larger for institutional investors than for household investors in all market capital-
izations and time periods, excluding the pre-crisis period small capitalization stocks. This
implies that institutional herding varies more from week to week than household investor
herding. It might be that institutional investors trade less often and that when they trade,
the trades happen at the same time. This might be because of e.g. monthly of quarterly
reviews or portfolio re-balancing that always happens during specific intervals.
When looking at the groups of household investors and institutional investors one must
keep in mind the possible limitations of the data used. For example, if a private investor
does his investing through a limited company (e.g. for tax reasons), they would most
likely be classified as a Finnish-owned private corporation instead of a household in-
vestor. Similarly it is possible that all relevant institutional investors are not included in the
group, even though the grouping was made according to the best available information
about the contents of each sector code in the data. Excluding investments made under
a nominee registered holding may also exclude trades that may be, in reality, made by
either households or institutional investors.
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Table 4.4. Results for average institutional investor LSV herding measure by time period
and stock market capitalization. The standard deviation of the LSV herding measure is
also presented for each period and market capitalization.
2005-2007 2007-2009 2005-2009
All sizes 4.8 % 7.4 % 5.7 %
Std. of herding 16.0 % 20.6 % 17.9 %
Large cap 6.2 % 7.4 % 6.7 %
Std. of herding 16.7 % 20.2 % 18.2 %
Mid cap 3.7 % 7.5 % 5.0 %
Std. of herding 16.0 % 20.9 % 18.0 %
Small Cap 3.8 % 7.1 % 5.1 %
Std. of herding 14.5 % 21.0 % 17.3 %
4.3 Herding by industry
Herding was also calculated between industries. An interesting question is whether there
is a difference in herding between industries and does herding change within an industry
when moving from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. These results are presented
in table 4.5.
Table 4.5. Average LSV herding results for each industry. The standard deviation of
herding is also presented for each industry and time period.
Industry 2005 - 2007 2007 - 2009
avg. LSV Std. avg. LSV Std.
Consumer Discretionary 9.85 % 12.82 % 8.56 % 13.16 %
Consumer Staples 7.36 % 10.29 % 9.64 % 12.18 %
Financials 9.88 % 11.36 % 11.17 % 13.34 %
Health Care 4.80 % 9.38 % 6.35 % 10.45 %
Industrials 9.11 % 11.23 % 9.40 % 12.66 %
Information Technology 9.35 % 11.33 % 11.15 % 14.17 %
Materials 11.71 % 12.26 % 11.88 % 12.97 %
Telecommunication Services 26.30 % 15.08 % 17.83 % 14.86 %
Utilities 14.28 % 10.77 % 13.49 % 11.91 %
There are clearly differences in herding between industries. Low levels of herding can
be found in the health care and consumer staples industries. Higher levels of herding
can be found in materials, utilities and most notably in telecommunication services. Here
it must be pointed out that both the health care industry and the telecommunications
industry contain only 2 companies. This means that the industry level herding reflects
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very strongly the herding of these few companies.
On average, the level of herding increased slightly when moving from the pre-crisis period
to the crisis period. This is of course reflected also in the industry level herding numbers.
The largest difference in herding between periods can be found in telecommunication
services, where herding decreased from 26.3 % to 17.83 %. The largest increase in
herding was in consumer staples, where herding rose from 7.36 % to 9.64 %. No clear
pattern emerges from these results and mostly the changes in herding between periods
is quite small (< 2 %). The standard deviation of herding increased in almost all industries
when moving from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period with the only exception being
telecommunication services.
In earlier research, Ge˛bka and Wohar (2013) found that on an international level, basic
materials, consumer services and oil and gas stocks show some evidence of herding.
Comparison with these results is difficult, since Ge˛bka and Wohar (2013) use a different
industry classification. In their research, Zheng, Li and Chiang (2017) find evidence that
herding is more prevalent in the financial and telecommunication industries and weaker in
industrial and consumer services industries. These are quite well in line with the findings
of this thesis.
Telecommunication services stands out from other industries because of its high amounts
of herding. Some possible reasons for such high herding numbers can be sought from
earlier literature. One explanation might be that telecommunication stocks were in style
at that time. Elisa Oyj, one of the two telecommunications companies, reported grow-
ing sales and profits in 2006 and 2007, but decreasing sales and profits on 2008. The
Elisa Oyj stock price reached its highest value in February 2007. The other telecommu-
nication company, TeliaSonera, reported record earnings for the year 2006 and its stock
price reached its highest point in April 2007. It might be that good news about funda-
mentals caught the attention of investors and created a buy-side herd, driving the stock
prices up. When the crisis period came around the direction of the herd reversed and
investors sold their shares, causing the stock price to decrease. It is noteworthy that
e.g. TeliaSonera reported mainly increasing sales and EBITDA numbers through 2008
to 2010. This could be interpreted as evidence of the possible illogical results of herding
(decreasing stock price while reporting increasing earnings). This sort of behaviour could
be explained by style investing: the certain types of stocks are in style, they are bought
(without regard to fundamentals) and when they are out of style, they are sold (again
without regard to fundamentals). This behaviour is also consistent with using momentum
investment strategies. For example the TeliaSonera stock price increased quite steadily
from 2003 to 2007. Using a momentum investment strategy investors would have bought
TeliaSonera because on recent positive returns. As soon as the stock price decreased
in 2007 investors would have started to sell because of poor recent returns. Again, the
trades would have been made without regard to fundamentals, basing decisions only on
the recent changes in stock price.
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5 HERDING, RETURNS AND VOLATILITY
One of the major questions of this thesis is whether there is a link between herding
and stock returns. This is studied in two ways: first, do past returns affect herding in
the present, and second, does present herding affect future returns? The link between
volatility and herding is also studied.
5.1 Herding and past returns
The relationship between herding and past returns was studied using a mixed effects
model. The specific stock and year-week combination are used as random effects, while
the different periods of past returns are used as fixed effects. The periods for which past
returns have been calculated are 1 year, 6 months, 3 months, 1 month, 1 week and the
current week. To remove autocorrelation, the periods have been calculated so that they
do not overlap. For example, if the "previous 1 week" period refers to week 52 of year
2005, then the "previous 1 month" period includes only weeks 51, 50 and 49. If week 52
had also been included, there would automatically be correlation between the returns of
"previous 1 week" and "previous 1 month". The same logic applies for all time periods.
The analysis was made using Matlab. Different combinations of periods were tested
and compared with each other until the one with most explanatory power was found.
For the sell-side herding measure (SHM) the model with the best explanatory power in-
cluded returns for the previous 1 year, previous 6 months, previous 1 month, previous
1 week and the current week. The results of the model for the SHM are in table 5.1.
The volatility of returns for different periods and the economic signifance of each explain-
ing variable is also included in the table. The economic significance is calculated as
Estimate  Volatility of returns. If the explaining variable changes one times it’s standard
deviation, then the LSV herding measure changes one times the economic significance.
As can be seen from table 5.1, there is a strong and statistically significant correlation
between past returns and sell-side herding. High past returns result in higher sell-side
herding. This would imply that investors in the Finnish market are contrarian investors,
selling past winners and thus locking in profits. The economic significance of the results
seems to increase slightly when moving closer to the herding week. To put the economic
significance values in perspective, the standard deviation of sell-side herding (SHM) is
13.93 %.
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Table 5.1. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects model used for explaining SHM with different periods of past returns. The stock
specific ISINs and the year-week combination were used as random effects. The regres-
sion model used is SHMt;t+4 = + 1 Rt 126;t 252 + 2 Rt 64;t 125 + 3 Rt 6;t 20 +
4 Rt 1;t 5 + 5 Rt;t+4 + isini + YearWeekn.
Name Estimate pValue Volatility
of returns
Economic
signifi-
cance
Intercept 0.08945 1.93E-42
Past returns over 1 Year 0.006645 9.06E-04 0.8609 0.57 %
Past returns over 6 months 0.005502 3.75E-05 1.2226 0.67 %
Past returns over 1 month 0.011468 1.01E-28 1.6799 1.93 %
Past returns over 1 week 0.003982 6.15E-13 2.951 1.17 %
Returns of the current week 0.006697 4.19E-45 2.9541 1.98 %
For buy-side herding (BHM), the model with most explanatory power included the returns
for previous 6 months, previous 1 month, previous 1 week and the current week. This
model differs from the sell-side model. The result for the BHM model are in table 5.2.
Table 5.2. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects model used for explaining BHM with different periods of past returns. The stock
specific ISINs and the year-week combination were used as random effects. The regres-
sion model used is BHMt;t+4 = + 1 Rt 64;t 125 + 2 Rt 6;t 20 + 3 Rt 1;t 5 + 4 
Rt;t+4 + isini + YearWeekn.
Name Estimate pValue Volatility
of returns
Economic
signifi-
cance
Intercept 0.075383 6.68E-60
Past returns over 6 months -0.00324 5.81E-04 1.2226 -0.40 %
Past returns over 1 month -0.00413 4.36E-07 1.6799 -0.69 %
Past returns over 1 week -0.00156 3.08E-04 2.951 -0.46 %
Returns of the current week -0.00288 7.28E-16 2.9541 -0.85 %
Again we can see a strong and statistically significant correlation between past returns
and herding. All of the coefficient estimates are negative, meaning that high past returns
result in lower buy-side herding. Or turned the other way, negative past returns result in
higher buy-side herding, meaning that investors buy past losers.
To put the economic significance values into perspective, the standard deviation of buy-
side herding (BHM) is 10.96 %.
Combining the results for both of the models, we can say that investors in the Finnish
market show contrarian tendencies, buying past losers and selling past winners. Using
data from Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that household investors were
contrarian investors. The findings of this thesis are similar, but even more general since
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they suggest that the average investor in the Finnish market follows a contrarian strategy.
Based on the estimated coefficients, it seems that the tendency to buy past losers is
weaker than the tendency to sell past winners. Hsieh (2013) also found that individual
investors in the Taiwanese market show contrarian tendencies, buying past losers and
selling past winners.
As mentioned in chapter 2 of this thesis, momentum investment strategies are sometimes
presented as a reason for herding. Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) found that mu-
tual funds in the US have a tendency to buy past winners; Wermers (1999) also found
that mutual funds show evidence of momentum investment strategies. Since the LSV
measure does not take trading volume into account, only the number of active traders,
institutions play a smaller part in the findings of this thesis. More weight is given to
household investors and other non-institutional investors, since they are greater in num-
ber. These non-institutional investors may also use momentum investment strategies.
Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009) suggest that individuals may be prone to momentum
investing because of the representativeness heuristic and the limited attention span of
individual investors. The representativeness heuristic means that investor take a small
sample recent data and expect it to represent the underlying distribution. This means that
investors over-weight recent returns in forecasting future returns. While (Barber, Odean
and Zhu 2009) suggest this would lead to momentum investing, one could argue also the
contrary.
If an investor sees that a stock price has risen to its all-time high they might think that this
implies it cannot go any higher. This is something that Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
called "misconceptions of chance". This means that people expect a sequence generated
by a random process to represent the characteristics of that process, even when the
sequence observed is short. If we think that the stock price process is random, and also
know that the long term annual yield of stocks is about 7 %, then we might think that
after abnormally high returns of, say 14 %, the stock price is likely to decrease so that the
annual return converges towards 7 %. Of course in reality this is not the case, since the
returns of different stocks and the average returns in different years may vary widely.
The limited attention span mentioned by Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009) means that when
choosing which stocks to trade, people may focus on the most attention grabbing ones.
Stocks in your portfolio that have risen a lot in the near past and are strongly in the green
are sure to grab your attention, as are stocks that have decreased in value recently (they
might also seem cheap when compared with their pre-decrease price).
One possible reason for the tendency to sell past winners is loss aversion. Loss aver-
sion means that "losses loom larger than corresponding gains" (Tversky and Kahneman
1991). For example, the pain one experiences when losing 100 euros is larger than the
joy one feels when gaining 100 euros. This implies that investors are more willing to sell
stocks that have already yielded a profit to lock those profits and thus avert a possible
future loss.
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The tendency to sell past winners instead of losers might also be explained by prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 2013). Kahneman and Tversky (2013) report that people
are willing to take large risks when trying to avert losses. When given a choice between
an 80 % chance to win 4000 or 3000 for sure, most people choose 3000 for sure over
the gamble, even though the expected value of the gamble is larger than 3000. However,
when these gains are reversed to losses, the preferences change. When given the choice
between an 80 % chance to lose 4000 (and 20 % to lose nothing) or a sure loss of 3000,
most people choose the gamble (Kahneman and Tversky 2013). It is probable that the
same applies to stocks. Selling a stock at a loss is equal to choosing a sure loss of a
certain amount. If people choose not to sell and instead keep holding the stock, there is
a chance that the stock price may increase and decrease their loss (or even turn the loss
into a profit). Even if this is not likely, it seems people are willing to take the risk and not
sell their stocks at a loss.
5.2 Herding and future returns
The second major question of this chapter is whether herding affects future returns. This
was studied in the same manner as the relationship between past returns and herding,
using a mixed effects model. Here the specific stock and year-week combination are
again used as random effects. Now the fixed effect is the amount of herding, which is
used the explain future profits. The periods for which profits have been obtained are
the current week (the week for which the herding was calculated), 1 week, 1 month, 3
months, 6 months and 1 year into the future.
For sell-side herding (SHM) the only statistically significant results were obtained for the
periods of current week, 1 week into the future and 1 month into the future. The results
can be seen in table 5.3.
Table 5.3. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects models used for explaining future returns using SHM. The regression model used
is Rj;k = +1 SHMt;t+4+ isini+YearWeekn, where Rj;k has different values for each
j and k.
Explained variable Estimate pValue Std of SHM Economic
signifi-
cance
Return over future 1 year -0.2525 2.50E-01 0.1393 -3.52 %
Return over future 6 months 0.4905 1.80E-01 0.1393 6.83 %
Return over future 3 months -0.0700 7.85E-01 0.1393 -0.97 %
Return over future 1 month -0.6008 4.87E-09 0.1393 -8.37 %
Return over future 1 week -0.5607 2.42E-03 0.1393 -7.81 %
Return over current week 2.0514 3.01E-30 0.1393 28.58 %
Here we can see that high sell-side herding correlates with higher profits in the current
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week, but low profits in the following week and following month. It must be noted that
the relationship between herding and current week returns is not clear. For example, if
high profits have been obtained in the beginning of the week (from Monday to Thursday)
and on Friday investors flock to sell the stock, it implies that high returns cause higher
sell-side herding (as already observed) and not the other way around. However, it is also
possible that the sell-side herding has occurred in the beginning of the week and after
that the stock enjoys larger returns. Thus the results regarding the current week are not
reliable.
The economic significance on these results is quite large. The results imply that if the
SHM of a certain week increases one times it’s standard deviation, then the returns of
the following week decrease by 7.81 p.p.’s. A causation of this magnitude seems unlikely
in real life.
For buy-side herding (BHM) the only statistically significant results were obtained for the
period of current week. Interestingly no statistically significant relationship was found
between buy-side herding and the returns of the following week or the following month,
like was found in sell-side herding. The results can be seen in table 5.4.
Table 5.4. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects models used for explaining future returns using BHM. The regression model used
is Rj;k = +1 BHMt;t+4+ isini+YearWeekn, where Rj;k has different values for each
j and k.
Explained variable Estimate pValue Std of BHM Economic
signifi-
cance
Return over future 1 year -0.0970 6.91E-01 0.1096 -1.06 %
Return over future 6 months -0.1309 6.03E-01 0.1096 -1.44 %
Return over future 3 months 0.0765 3.25E-01 0.1096 0.84 %
Return over future 1 month -0.0544 7.02E-01 0.1096 -0.60 %
Return over future 1 week -0.0326 8.91E-01 0.1096 -0.36 %
Return over current week -1.9662 2.29E-15 0.1096 -21.55 %
Here the estimated coefficient for the current week is negative, implying that higher buy-
side herding correlates with lower current week returns. As with sell-side herding, here
the causation between current week returns and herding is not clear.
When considering the problems with causation relating to current week returns and herd-
ing, the fact that different periods were statistically significant when comparing sell-side
herding with buy-side herding, and that both sell-side and buy-side herding seem to cor-
relate with lower future returns, on the whole no strong conclusions can be drawn. Based
on these results, there does not seem to be a clear relationship between herding and
future returns. This is to be expected, since if a relationship had been found, investors
could observe current trading patterns and deduce future stock price changes.
An interesting questions of course is whether herding seems to be rational or irrational. If
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high buy-side herding had correlated with higher future returns, that would have implied
that herding is rational. Correspondingly, if high sell-side herding had correlated with low
future returns, it would have implied that sell-side herding is rational. Since the results
are inconclusive, nothing new can be said about the possible rationality of herding.
5.3 Herding and volatility
The relationship between herding and volatility was also studied using a similar mixed
effects model as before. The volatilities were calculated as follows: first, data on intra-day
trades was obtained, containing the exact time of the trade and the trade price. Then the
day was divided into 5-minute intervals, and a mean price was counted for each interval
as the arithmetic mean of all trades completed within this interval. This means that for
each trading day there was a maximum of 102 5-minute intervals. For many stocks and
days there were less intervals, since there sometimes were no trades in all possible
intervals. Next, returns between these 5-minute intervals were calculated, resulting in a
maximum of 101 return observations for each trading day. These returns were then used
in calculating the daily volatilities. These daily volatilities were then used in calculating the
average volatility for different time periods: previous 1 year, previous 6 months, previous 3
months, previous 1 month, previous 1 week, current week, future 1 week, future 1 month,
future 3 months, future 6 months and future 1 year.
As with previous models, past volatilities were used in trying to explain herding. Here the
specific stock and year-week combination were again used as random effects. For SHM,
the model with the best explaining power included only the volatility over the past 1 year
as the explaining variable. The results are presented in table 5.5.
Table 5.5. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects model used for explaining SHM using past volatilities. The regression model used
is SHMt;t+4 = + 1  t 126;t 252 + isini + YearWeekn.
Name Estimate pValue Std of volatility Economic
significance
Intercept 0.09738 1.97E-56
Volatility over past 1 year -0.00289 8.14E-04 1.3591 -0.39 %
This result implies that an increase in volatility during the past year decreases the cur-
rent SHM. While this result is statistically significant, it not economically significant. If
volatility increases one times it’s standard deviation, the SHM would decrease 0.39 p.p.’s.
Compared to the standard deviation of SHM (13.93 %) this result is small.
When modelling buy-side herding (BHM), the best explanation power was with a model
which had the previous 1 week as the fixed effect. This result is presented in table 5.6.
The result implies that higher volatility during the previous 1 week decreases the BHM
in the current week. This result, as in the case of SHM, is statistically significant but
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Table 5.6. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects model used for explaining BHM using past volatilities. The regression model used
is BHMt;t+4 = + 1  t 1;t 5 + isini + YearWeekn.
Name Estimate pValue Std of volatility Economic
significance
Intercept 0.08023 2.25E-76
Volatility over past 1 week -0.00491 2.71E-02 1.3767 -0.68 %
not economically so. If the volatility of the previous 1 week increases by one time it’s
standard deviation then BHM decreases by 0.68 p.p.’s. Again, when compared to the
standard deviaton of BHM (10.96 %) the result is small.
Based on these results it would seems that higher past volatility would cause lower SHM
and lower BHM. This would mean that high past volatility would cause investors to herd
less in all directions. Still, when considering that only one period had any statistically
significant explaining power in both cases, it seems that past volatility has no effect on
herding or the effect is very small.
To study this further, the relationship between past volatilities and the LSV herding mea-
sure values was also tested. Here the results are similar to the results regarding SHM; the
only period with statistical significance is the previous 1 year. The results are presented
in table 5.7.
Table 5.7. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects model used for explaining LSV using past volatilities. The regression model used
is LSVt;t+4 = + 1  t 126;t 252 + isini + YearWeekn.
Name Estimate pValue Std of volatility Economic
significance
Intercept 0.10103 1.83E-121
Volatility over past 1 year -0.00303 1.15E-05 1.3591 -0.41 %
Again, as with SHM, the result is statistically significant but not economically so. If volatil-
ity over the previous year increases by one times it’s standard deviation, LSV decreases
by 0.41 %. Compared to the standard deviation of LSV (12.60 %), this is not economically
very significant.
When trying to explain future volatility with herding, no statistically significant results were
obtained. The sell-side herding (SHM) results can be seen in table 5.8 and the buy-side
herding (BHM) in table 5.9. The relationship between future volatility and LSV was also
tested, but no statistically significant results obtained there either. These results are not
presented, since they add no value on top of the presented SHM and BHM results.
Looking at the sell-side results, we can see that current sell-side herding has no statis-
tically significant correlation with future volatility in any of the tested periods. The coeffi-
cient estimates are mostly positive, implying that higher sell-side herding would increase
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Table 5.8. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects models used for explaining future volatility using SHM. The regression model used
is j;k = + 1  SHMt;t+4 + isini + YearWeekn, where j;k has different values for each
j and k (days).
Period Estimate pValue Std of SHM Economic
significance
Future volatility over 1 year -0.3401 1.15E-01 0.1393 -4.74 %
Future volatility over 6 months 0.2165 2.22E-01 0.1393 3.02 %
Future volatility over 3 months 0.2221 1.64E-01 0.1393 3.09 %
Future volatility over 1 month 0.0173 8.71E-01 0.1393 0.24 %
Future volatility over 1 week 0.0919 3.90E-01 0.1393 1.28 %
Volatility over the current week 0.0231 8.35E-01 0.1393 0.32 %
future volatility. But considering that the results are not statistically significant, and their
economic significance is quite low, no such claim can really be made.
Table 5.9. The coefficient estimates, p-values and economic significances for the mixed
effects models used for explaining future volatility using BHM. The regression model used
is j;k = + 1  BHMt;t+4 + isini + YearWeekn, where j;k has different values for each
j and k (days).
Period Estimate pValue Std of BHM Economic
significance
Future volatility over 1 year -0.1749 3.73E-01 0.1096 -1.92 %
Future volatility over 6 months -0.0075 9.56E-01 0.1096 -0.08 %
Future volatility over 3 months -0.1367 1.46E-01 0.1096 -1.50 %
Future volatility over 1 month 0.0236 8.37E-01 0.1096 0.26 %
Future volatility over 1 week -0.0752 5.25E-01 0.1096 -0.82 %
Volatility over the current week -0.1996 7.47E-02 0.1096 -2.19 %
For buy-side herding, similar results are obtained. No statistically significant correlation
between present buy-side herding and future volatility was found. Here the coefficient
estimates are mostly negative, which would imply that higher buy-side herding causes
lower future volatility. But again, since the results are not statistically significant and their
economic significance is quite small, one cannot really back up such a claim.
When looking at the results about herding and future volatility as a whole, it seems that
there is no statistically significant link between herding and future volatility. As previously
mentioned, some previous authors (Alevy, Haigh and List 2007; Philippas et al. 2013;
Scharfstein, Stein et al. 1990) suggest that herding destabilizes markets and increases
volatility. These new results do not either confirm or contradict these claims.
In his well known study, Wermers (1999) found abnormal return differences between
stocks most heavily bought and sold by institutional investors. He reports that the stocks
most heavily bought experienced abnormally high returns during the next quarter and
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there seemed to be no consequent return reversal. This suggests that herding by in-
stitutional investors is rational and speeds up the price discovery process. In his paper
Wermers (1999) mentions that "Of course, the limitations of our quarterly holdings data
set prevent us from making conclusive statements about whether herding destabilizes
daily or weekly stock prices". Now, using weekly data, no statistically significant link be-
tween buy-side herding and future volatility was found. This does not support the claim
that herding would be rational, although they do not imply that herding would be irra-
tional either. While the coefficient estimates do imply that sell-side herding increases
future volatility and buy-side herding decreases future volatility, because the results are
not statistically significant, no strong arguments can be made in any direction. In addi-
tion, Wermers (1999) studied only institutional investors, while the data used in this study
includes all kinds of investors.
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6 CONCLUSION
This Master’s Thesis examined herding in the Finnish stock market, the relationship be-
tween herding and returns, and the relationship between herding and volatility. This chap-
ter summarizes the findings, evaluates the research and suggests futher research topics.
6.1 Summary of results
The data used is provided by Euroclear Finland Oy (previously Finnish Central Security
Depository. The records are duplicates of the official certificates of ownership and trades,
meaning that the data is extremely reliable. The data contains daily level records of
investor’s trades. The data also includes sector codes so that the separation of household
investors and institutional investors is possible. The frequency of observations and the
ability to separate investor types from the data make this truly an unique set of data.
Using this data, this thesis set out to answer 5 main questions: (1) was there herding
in the Finnish stock market between 2005 and 2009, and if so, how much? (2) Do past
stock returns affect herding? (3) Does herding affect future stock returns? (4) Does past
volatility affect herding? (5) Does herding affect future volatility?
Between 2005 and 2009 there was considerable herding in the Finnish stock market. The
average LSV herding measure for the whole period and all investors was 10.10 %. This
can be considered to be quite high, but not unprecedented. Similar results have been
reported by e.g. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999), Kim and S.-J. Wei (2002) and Kyrolainen
and Perttunen (2003). The average herding amount in the pre-crisis period was 9.79 %
and it rose to 10.40 % during the crisis period. While some researches have reported
lower amounts of herding during the crisis period (e.g. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999)),
results with higher amounts of herding during the crisis period have also been reported
(e.g. Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela (2012)).
It also seems that between 2005 and 2009 large capitalization stocks experienced more
herding than smaller capitalization stocks. Some earlier empirical work (e.g. Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny (1992)) and theories (e.g. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000)) suggest
that smaller capitalization stocks should and, in fact, do experience more herding. On the
other hand some theories (e.g. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) and Graham (1999))
and empirical results (Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela 2012) point in the other direction.
In this thesis the data quality is exceptional and there is a good amount of observations
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for all stock-week combinations, even for small capitalization stocks (minimum amount of
active traders in a week for small capitalization stocks was 389 and the average amount
of active traders in a week was 1671), which means the results are reliable. Still, no clear
contradiction exists, because the earlier empirical work with contrarian results is from a
different market and a different time period. It is possible that both markets and time
periods differ in this regard.
A difference between buy- and sell-side herding was also found. During the pre-crisis
period the amounts of buy- and sell-side herding were practically equal: 9.59 % for sell-
side herding and 9.64 % for buy-side. However, during the crisis period a clear gap
emerged: sell-side herding rose to 12.11 % and buy-side herding decreased to 7.23 %.
This implies that during times of crisis sell-side herding is more common than buy-side
herding. This is in line with Brown, K. D. Wei and Wermers (2013), who found that funds
are more likely to herd on the sell-side than on the buy-side. The correlation between
SHM and BHM was also studied and it was found to be negative: -0.1942 in the pre-
crisis period and -0.4787 in the crisis period. This implies that when sell-side herding
increases, buy-side herding decreases. This relationship becomes stronger in the crisis
period. This implies that on a weekly level, on average, investors herd either on the sell-
side or the buy-side, but usually not both at the same time. This might be because of
e.g. momentum-investment strategies, where investors sell stocks that have seen recent
losses (and buy recent winners). This is interesting because it is perfectly possible that
during any one week, some stocks perform well and some stocks perform poorly. Thus,
if an investor uses a momentum investment strategy, they should buy the well-performing
stocks and sell the poorly performing ones. This means there should not necessarily be
a negative correlation between SHM and BHM. This negative correlation could be seen
as evidence of the irrationality of herding. Christie and Huang (1995) suggest that in
the presence of irrational herding, the returns of all stocks converge because investors
do not make a difference between different stocks, but treat all stocks equally despite
their fundamentals. The results of this thesis support this claim. The negative correlation
between SHM and BHM suggests that in any given week, investors flock to either sell
or buy, but not both at the same time. This seems irrational, since it is unlikely that it
is rational to only sell stocks during one week and only buy stocks during another. This
kind of behaviour implies that when herding, investors do not make a difference between
different stocks but instead just either sell or buy the average stock, following the herd.
There was also a difference in herding volatility between the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
In the pre-crisis period, the average volatility of the LSV herding measure was 11.86 %.
In the crisis period this rose to 13.31 %. The difference is more clearly seen when com-
paring SHM and BHM. In the pre-crisis period, the standard deviation of SHM was 2.02 %
and it rose to 3.59 % in the crisis period. For BHM, the standard deviation increased from
2.38 % to 2.74 % when moving from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. This im-
plies that in times of crisis the amount of herding varies more wildly from week to week. A
visual representation of this is presented in figure 4.1. This is especially true for sell-side
herding. This might mean that in times of crisis investors are more sensitive to negative
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news and negative market sentiment than in non-crisis periods and are more quick to sell
than to buy stocks.
A difference between the behaviour of household investors and institutional investors was
also observed. The average herding amount for household investors during the whole
study period was 6.8 %. In the pre-crisis period the average amount of herding was 6.5
%, increasing to 7.1 % in the crisis period. For institutional investors, the average herding
amount for the whole study period was 5.7 %. For institutions, the average pre-crisis
herding was 4.8 % while the crisis period herding was 7.4 %. Here an interesting ob-
servation can be made: in the pre-crisis period institutions herded less than household
investors. During the crisis period institutions herded more than household investors (7.4
% for institutions vs. 7.1 % for households). In earlier research institutions have had
low levels of herding: Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) reporting 2.7 %, Wermers
(1999) 3.4 % and Brown, K. D. Wei and Wermers (2013) 3.3 % for US based funds. The
pre-crisis herding for institutions (4.8 %) is quite well in line with these earlier findings.
The increase in institutional herding from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period is sig-
nificant. In some previous studies (Choe, Kho and Stulz 1999; Kim and S.-J. Wei 2002)
the amounts of herding have been lower during times of crisis, but e.g. Blasco, Corredor
and Ferreruela (2012) found that herding increases during times of crisis. Based on the
results of this thesis, it seems that especially institutions in the Finnish stock market herd
more in times of crisis.
One point of view also studied was herding by industry. All stocks were divided into
9 different industries and the average amounts of herding by each industry were com-
pared. The results are presented in table 4.5. The lowest levels of herding were found in
consumer staples and health care industries. The highest levels of herding were found
in utilities and most notably telecommunication services, where pre-crisis herding levels
were up to 26.30 %. It must be noted that both the telecommunications industry and the
health care industry contain only 2 companies. This makes the results regarding them
less reliable than the results regarding other industries. On average, the level of herd-
ing increased slightly when moving from the pre-crisis period into the crisis period. This
is of course also reflected in industry-specific herding amounts. The largest increase in
herding between periods was in consumer staples, where herding increased from 7.36
% to 9.64 %. The largest decrease in herding was in telecommunication services, where
herding decreased from 26.30 % to 17.83 %. Ge˛bka and Wohar (2013) also studied
herding in different industries on an international level. They found that basic materials,
consumer services and oil and gas stocks show most evidence of herding. Comparing
with these results is unfortunately difficult, since Ge˛bka and Wohar (2013) uses a differ-
ent industry classification. Zheng, Li and Chiang (2017) also studied herding in different
industries. They found that cross-industry herding occurs most commonly in the telecom-
munication and financial industries. They also found that herding is more pronounced in
bear markets. These findings are well in line with the results of this thesis.
A link between past returns and herding was found. Based on a mixed effects model with
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the specific stock and year-week combination as random variables it seems that high past
returns correlate with higher sell-side herding while negative past returns correlate with
buy-side herding. This suggests that the average investor in the Finnish market uses a
contrarian strategy, buying past losers and selling past winners. In their research, Grin-
blatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999) found that mutual funds show
a tendency to use momentum investment strategies. The majority of investors in the
Finnish stock market are non-institutional investors, which might explain this difference in
findings. In their research, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that household investors
show contrarian tendencies. Hsieh (2013) also found that household investors in Taiwan
show contrarian tendencies. Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009) have suggested that individ-
ual investors might be more prone to momentum investment strategies than institutional
investors. These findings do not support this argument. Some possible psychological
reasons for this contrarian behaviour might be "misconceptions of chance" or loss aver-
sion (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). The tendency to sell
past winners instead of losers might also be explained by prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 2013).
When studying the relationship between herding and future returns, no conclusive re-
sults were obtained. While some statistically significant periods were found, some of
the results contradict each other. The economic significance calculated does not seem
believable either. There were some results that suggest that high sell-side herding is cor-
related with lower profits during the following week and following month. Considering that
this relationship was found only for some time periods, and only with sell-side herding, no
strong conclusion can be made. Based on these findings, nothing conclusive can be said
about the rationality of herding on the basis of future returns.
For the relationship between past volatility and herding, statistically significant results
were found only for one period for both SHM and BHM. Neither of these results is eco-
nomically significant. On the whole no clear link between past volatility and herding was
found. When trying to explain future volatility with herding, no statistically significant re-
sults were obtained either. Thus nothing can be said about the possible stabilizing (or
destablizing) effect of herding. As previously stated, many authors (Alevy, Haigh and List
2007; Philippas et al. 2013; Scharfstein, Stein et al. 1990) argue that herding destabilizes
markets while some (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman 1994) argue that herding
might in fact stabilize markets. Sadly, this thesis does not add anything to this discussion.
6.2 Evaluation of the research
A good number of studies have been made about herding during recent years. Yet, I be-
lieve there are still aspects worth researching, and I hope that this thesis has done its part
in increasing knowledge about herding. Still, even this thesis has some shortcomings.
The data that is used in this thesis is of exceptional quality and very reliable. This gives a
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strong base for conducting good research. For most weeks and the whole investor pop-
ulation there are enough observations to make reliable deductions. Unfortunately, with
especially small capitalization stocks and institutional investors, some weeks contain only
a few observations. This lowers the reliability of those results. The LSV herding measure
chosen for this study is widely used and researched. Still, as mentioned in chapter 2,
the measure has received some critique. Because of the flaws that may be present in
the LSV herding measure, one must be wary in the interpretation of results. The biggest
question is quite fundamental: does the LSV herding measure really measure herding?
But on the other hand, what kind of a measure would accurately capture only real herd-
ing, but no spurious herding? To my knowledge, such a measure does not exist at the
moment. Thus in my opinion, the LSV herding measure was the best one for this thesis.
The results of this thesis regarding the amount of herding are strong and compatible with
earlier research. Perhaps the least reliable results are related to institutional investors
and small capitalization stocks because of the lower amount of observations. Similarly
the increase in herding that has observed when moving from the pre-crisis period into the
crisis period has been observed also in some previous research. The results regarding
the relationship between past returns and herding are strong and give an interesting
opportunity to speculate about the possible reasons behind the observed relationship.
Unfortunately, the results about the relationship between herding and future returns are
inconclusive. This is also quite logical, since if a relationship had been found, it would
have implied that one can forecast future returns based on past herding. Similarly, when
studying the relationship between herding and both past and future volatility, no clear links
were observed. This is a shame, since the rationality of herding is an interesting topic. If
a statistically significant link had been found, this would have perhaps told us something
about the possible rationality of herding. But in light of the observed results this thesis
does not add anything new to that discussion.
As already discussed on chapter 3, the reliability of this study is, in my opinion, good.
The data is of good quality and methods have been outlined accurately. The possible
issues are more related to validity. The LSV herding measure may not accurately capture
herding. Also, the results may not be generalisable to other markets or time periods. At
most, the results perhaps reflect the situation in a smaller market during the study period
of 2005 - 2009.
6.3 Further research suggestions
There are still many markets and time periods where herding has not been researched.
For example, while searching for earlier research about herding, I did not come across
any studies that were made about other Scandinavian markets. Studying herding in coun-
tries similar to Finland might be interesting and could maybe reveal a link between market
size and herding. Herding in different market conditions is also an interesting angle. For
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example, after 1.1.2009 the OMX Helsinki 25 index has seen a steady increase in value.
It could be interesting to see whether herding has varied within a single, long bull market.
In this study separating real herding from spurious herding was given little thought. In
future research one could try to control for spurious herding by using e.g. investor reports,
press releases and other news. It might be possible to separate simultaneous trades
caused by a change in fundamentals from real herding by controlling for new information
releases. This could perhaps be done even with the herding measured currently available.
While the LSV herding measure is widely used, it has received critique and some up-
grades have been suggested e.g. by Frey, Herbst andWalter (2014) and Bellando (2010).
As previously suggested by Merli and Roger (2013), one could apply both the original LSV
measure and the modified version suggested by Frey, Herbst and Walter (2014) to the
same data set and compare the results. This might reveal something new about the pos-
sible shortcomings of the LSV measure and thus be a basis for re-evaluation of earlier
research conducted by using the original LSV herding measure.
In herding literature, the empirical research on the amount of herding and the theoretical
research about the reasons behind herding are not really connected. Many possible rea-
sons for herding have been presented, and herding has been measured in many markets
and different time periods. The link that ties these together is still somewhat missing.
If one could bridge this gap between the theoretical behavioural psychology research
about the reasons behind herding, and the empirical herding measurement research,
they would surely have a huge impact on herding research as a whole. Unfortunately, it
might be impossible to gather data that clearly links the thoughts and motives of individual
investors to the trades they make.
55
REFERENCES
Alevy, J. E., Haigh, M. S. and List, J. A. (2007). Information cascades: Evidence from a
field experiment with financial market professionals. The Journal of Finance 62.1, 151–
180.
Baltakys, K., Baltakiene˙, M., Kärkkäinen, H. and Kanniainen, J. (2019). Neighbors matter:
Geographical distance and trade timing in the stock market. Finance Research Letters
31.
Baltakys, K., Kanniainen, J. and Emmert-Streib, F. (2018). Multilayer aggregation with
statistical validation: Application to investor networks. Scientific reports 8.1, 8198.
Barber, B. M., Odean, T. and Zhu, N. (2009). Systematic noise. Journal of Financial Mar-
kets 12.4, 547–569.
Barberis, N. and Shleifer, A. (2003). Style investing. Journal of financial Economics 68.2,
161–199.
Bellando, R. (2010). Measuring herding intensity: a hard task.
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom,
and cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of political Economy 100.5,
992–1026.
Bikhchandani, S. and Sharma, S. (2000). Herd behavior in financial markets. IMF Staff
papers 47.3, 279–310.
Blasco, N., Corredor, P. and Ferreruela, S. (2012). Does herding affect volatility? Implica-
tions for the Spanish stock market. Quantitative Finance 12.2, 311–327.
Brown, N. C., Wei, K. D. and Wermers, R. (2013). Analyst recommendations, mutual fund
herding, and overreaction in stock prices. Management Science 60.1, 1–20.
Chang, E. C., Cheng, J. W. and Khorana, A. (2000). An examination of herd behavior
in equity markets: An international perspective. Journal of Banking & Finance 24.10,
1651–1679.
Choe, H., Kho, B.-C. and Stulz, R. M. (1999). Do foreign investors destabilize stock mar-
kets? The Korean experience in 1997. Journal of Financial Economics 54.2, 227–264.
ISSN: 0304-405X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00037-9. URL:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X99000379.
Christie, W. G. and Huang, R. D. (1995). Following the pied piper: Do individual returns
herd around the market?: Financial Analysts Journal 51.4, 31–37.
Dorn, D., Huberman, G. and Sengmueller, P. (2008). Correlated trading and returns. The
Journal of Finance 63.2, 885–920.
Falkenstein, E. G. (1996). Preferences for stock characteristics as revealed by mutual
fund portfolio holdings. The Journal of Finance 51.1, 111–135.
56
Frey, S., Herbst, P. and Walter, A. (2014). Measuring mutual fund herding–a structural
approach. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 32, 219–
239.
Froot, K. A., O’connell, P. G. and Seasholes, M. S. (2001). The portfolio flows of interna-
tional investors. Journal of financial Economics 59.2, 151–193.
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D. S. and Stein, J. C. (1992). Herd on the street: Informational
inefficiencies in a market with short-term speculation. The Journal of Finance 47.4,
1461–1484.
Ge˛bka, B. and Wohar, M. E. (2013). International herding: Does it differ across sectors?:
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 23, 55–84.
Gompers, P. A. and Metrick, A. (2001). Institutional investors and equity prices. The quar-
terly journal of Economics 116.1, 229–259.
Goodfellow, C., Bohl, M. T. and Gebka, B. (2009). Together we invest? Individual and
institutional investors’ trading behaviour in Poland. International Review of Financial
Analysis 18.4, 212–221.
Graham, J. R. (1999). Herding among investment newsletters: Theory and evidence. The
Journal of Finance 54.1, 237–268.
Grinblatt, M. and Keloharju, M. (2000). The investment behavior and performance of vari-
ous investor types: a study of Finland’s unique data set. Journal of financial economics
55.1, 43–67.
– (2001). What makes investors trade?: The Journal of Finance 56.2, 589–616.
Grinblatt, M., Titman, S. and Wermers, R. (1995). Momentum investment strategies, port-
folio performance, and herding: A study of mutual fund behavior. The American eco-
nomic review, 1088–1105.
Hirshleifer, D. and Hong Teoh, S. (2003). Herd behaviour and cascading in capital mar-
kets: A review and synthesis. European Financial Management 9.1, 25–66.
Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A. and Titman, S. (1994). Security analysis and trading
patterns when some investors receive information before others. The Journal of Fi-
nance 49.5, 1665–1698.
Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1992). A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural
Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100.5, 992–1026.
Hsieh, S.-F. (2013). Individual and institutional herding and the impact on stock returns:
Evidence from Taiwan stock market. International Review of Financial Analysis 29,
175–188.
Hwang, S. and Salmon, M. (2004). Market stress and herding. Journal of Empirical Fi-
nance 11.4, 585–616.
Jones, S. L., Lee, D. and Weis, E. (1999). Herding and feedback trading by different
types of institutions and the effects on stock prices. Unpublished working paper, Indiana
University, Indianapolis Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw GA, and Merrill Lynch
and Company, New York.
57
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (2013). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Handbook of the fundamentals of financial decision making: Part I. World Scien-
tific, 99–127.
Kim, W. and Wei, S.-J. (2002). Foreign portfolio investors before and during a crisis.
Journal of international economics 56.1, 77–96.
Klein, A. C. (2013). Time-variations in herding behavior: Evidence from a Markov switch-
ing SUR model. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 26,
291–304.
Kyrolainen, P. J. and Perttunen, J. (2003). Investors’ activity and trading behavior. EFA
2002 Berlin Meetings Presented Paper, EFMA Helinski Meetings.
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1992). The impact of institutional trading
on stock prices. Journal of financial economics 32.1, 23–43.
Lin, W., Tsai, S.-C. and Sun, D. (2009). What Causes Herding: Information Cascade or
Search Cost?:
Merli, M. and Roger, T. (2013). What drives the herding behavior of individual investors?:
Finance 34.3, 67–104.
Nofsinger, J. R. and Sias, R. W. (1999). Herding and feedback trading by institutional and
individual investors. The Journal of finance 54.6, 2263–2295.
Oehler, A. and Chao, G. G.-C. (2000). Institutional herding in bond markets.
Philippas, N., Economou, F., Babalos, V. and Kostakis, A. (2013). Herding behavior in
REITs: Novel tests and the role of financial crisis. International Review of Financial
Analysis 29, 166–174.
Raddatz, C. and Schmukler, S. L. (2011). Deconstructing herding: evidence from pension
fund Investment behavior. The World Bank.
Richards, A. J. (1999). Idiosyncratic Risk An Empirical Analysis, with Implications for the
Risk of Relative-Value Trading Strategies.
Saunders, M. (2016). Research methods for business students. eng. Seventh edition.
New York: Pearson Education. ISBN: 9781292016627.
Scharfstein, D. S., Stein, J. C. et al. (1990). Herd behavior and investment. American
Economic Review 80.3, 465–479.
Sias, R. W. (2004). Institutional herding. The Review of Financial Studies 17.1, 165–206.
Siikanen, M., Baltakys, K., Kanniainen, J., Vatrapu, R., Mukkamala, R. and Hussain, A.
(2018). Facebook drives behavior of passive households in stock markets. Finance
Research Letters 27, 208–213.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and bi-
ases. science 185.4157, 1124–1131.
– (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. The quarterly
journal of economics 106.4, 1039–1061.
Vayanos, D. and Wang, T. (2007). Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in
asset markets. Journal of Economic Theory 136.1, 66–104.
Wermers, R. (1999). Mutual fund herding and the impact on stock prices. the Journal of
Finance 54.2, 581–622.
58
Wylie, S. (2005). Fund manager herding: a test of the accuracy of empirical results using
UK data. The Journal of Business 78.1, 381–403.
Zheng, D., Li, H. and Chiang, T. C. (2017). Herding within industries: Evidence from Asian
stock markets. International Review of Economics & Finance 51, 487–509.
